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WHAT EQUITY, THE PROMISE ECONOMY, AND
COGNITION MEAN FOR HOW FIDUCIARY LAW
SHOULD DEVELOP
H. Justin Pace*
Scholarship on fiduciary law has long been divided into two camps:
traditionalist and contractarian. Those two camps have largely been talking
past each other, however, because each fails to appreciate that there are
really two distinct, coherent bodies of fiduciary law. There are traditional
fiduciary relationships rooted in equity and modern fiduciary relationships
rooted in statute and contract. Much of the confusion in the case law can be
attributed to judges attempting to apply assumptions developed for
traditional, equitable fiduciary relationships to statutory and contractual
fiduciary relationships better suited for a modern economy built on
promises.
Scholars and judges should appreciate that there are two bodies of
fiduciary law and that they require different approaches. Rather than the
top-down analysis that has typically been applied to traditional fiduciary
obligations, judges should apply a bottom-up analysis to modern, statutory
and contractual obligations. That is, judges should perform a data-driven
analysis that closely examines the relative statutory and contractual
language. This will better fit the needs of legislatures in providing for those
fiduciary relationships and the needs of parties in entering into them. The
modern, statutory and contractual form of fiduciary obligation is a rational
response to a design problem stemming from changes in the law and in the
economy.
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INTRODUCTION
Fiduciary obligation1 has a long history in the law. Its roots are in equity
dating back several centuries. And that original conception of fiduciary
obligation persists in recognizable form in, for example, the law of trusts,
one of the original sources of fiduciary obligation. But fiduciary obligation
has spread into a diverse and large array of bodies of law as the economy has
come to largely be made up of promises. Where fiduciary obligation at its
roots was equitable and judge-made, its modern iterations are typically
created and defined by statute and by contract. Questions of fiduciary
obligation now most often come up in the context of business organization
law. In that context, the statutory and contractual roots and nature of the
relevant fiduciary obligations are particularly important.
Those equitable roots, though, continue to exercise a powerful influence
over fiduciary law. Although modern fiduciary obligation in the business
organization context is a very different sort of animal, judges continue to talk
about fiduciary obligation in much the same way. The language used reflects
how judges think about fiduciary obligation. Too often a single set of
assumptions are applied to what are in fact two distinct, coherent bodies of
law. This, in part, explains why existing arguments regarding fiduciary law
are incomplete and unsatisfying, whether made by traditionalists who talk
about fiduciary obligation in moral terms, focus on fiduciary obligation more
broadly, and found their work in philosophy, or made by contractarians who
talk about fiduciary obligation in contractual terms, focus on the business
1. Fiduciary, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (8th ed. 2004) (defining a fiduciary as “1. A
person who is required to act for the benefit of another person on all matters within the scope
of their relationship; one who owes to another the duties of good faith, trust, confidence, and
candor [ ]. 2. One who must exercise a high standard of care in managing another’s money
or property [ ].”)
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organization law context, and found their work in economics.
Fiduciary obligation grew from its narrow, equitable roots to extend to
a wide variety of types of relationships. Those relationships have included,
among others, trustee-beneficiary, agent-principal, guardian-ward, attorneyclient, corporate manager-corporation, majority shareholder-minority
shareholder, partner-partner and partnership, bank-borrower, franchisorfranchisee, investment advisor- and broker-client, ERISA plan
administrator- and trustee-plan participants,2 executor- and administratorestate,3 physician- and psychiatrist-patient, union representative-union and union membership, and even husband-community property.4
That growth, in part, came from the application by judges of equitable
principles to new types of relationships, but it is also the result of expansion
by statute and contract. Fiduciary concepts have been borrowed from equity
and “bolted on” to various bodies of law using statute and contract, and often
redefined in the process. This has given the flexibility needed to keep
fiduciary obligation relevant in a changing economy where promises are
more important than property. These two distinct sources of fiduciary law
have resulted in separate bodies of fiduciary law, a dichotomy that is
underappreciated.
In order to better understand why judges talk about fiduciary obligations
the way they do and why it matters, it is helpful to understand not just the
equitable roots of fiduciary obligation but also the concept of a “schema.”
In psychology literature, schemas are “knowledge structures that are
comprised of assumptions, expectations, and generic prior understandings.”5
Despite the two sources of fiduciary law, judges tend to hold a single schema
for fiduciary obligation that is only valid for equitable fiduciaries. This is
visible in the frequent appearance of morally inflected language, equitable
reasoning, and reasoning by analogy in opinions by judges deciding
questions of fiduciary obligation. Contra to the assertions of contractarian
scholars, those words matter. The schema influences judicial decisionmaking (as do other cognitive limitations). However, because there are two
distinct bodies of fiduciary obligation, the application of the schema where
fiduciary obligation is created and defined by statute, contract, or both —
especially in the business organization context — results in a judicial error
rate that is higher than it should or could be.

2. Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, Contract and Fiduciary Duty, 36 J.L. &
ECON. 425, 429–34 (1993) (discussing the duty of loyalty and fiduciary duty in the context of
trustee relationships).
3. Gregory S. Alexander, Essay: A Cognitive Theory of Fiduciary Relationships, 85
CORNELL L. REV. 767, 768 (1999).
4. Tamar Frankel, Fiduciary Law, 71 CALIF. L. REV. 795, 796, 807, 817 (1983).
5. Alexander, supra note 3, at 770.
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I assert that a schema poorly suited for the second, modern type of
fiduciary obligation is frequently used and that it should be discarded in
analyzing those obligations to be replaced by “bottom-up” analysis. I also
argue that the modern statutory and contractual form of fiduciary obligation
is a rational response to changes in the law and in the economy and to
problems of design. As the economy continues to grow and change,
legislatures have and will continue to expand the relationships to which
fiduciary obligations apply, and to customize those obligations. This
threatens to add cost associated with complexity; legislatures can mitigate
this cost by leveraging existing fiduciary law. And doing so is not in
irreconcilable conflict with moral considerations.
This paper is agnostic on the question of what the proper fiduciary
duties in any given fiduciary relationship are. Rather, the focus is on what
schema judges use and how it affects their decision making and whether,
from a 10,000-foot view, the modern statutory and contractual form of
fiduciary obligation is a rational approach to modern needs. This paper also
brackets discussion of possible implications of some of the issues raised,
such as the role of equity and remedies and the consequences in bankruptcy
that classifying a claim as fiduciary or contractual may have. Rather than
trying to delineate a precise definition of what fiduciary relationships should
be, this Article accepts that fiduciary obligations have been applied very
broadly. Finally, this article relies on a theoretical and doctrinal argument
for the schema that judges apply to fiduciaries. Empirical research using
survey and experimental methods is warranted.
Part I of this Article will explore the equitable roots of traditional
fiduciary obligation and how that has shaped fiduciary law. Part II will
explore the increasing role of statute and contract in creating, defining, and
limiting fiduciary obligations. Part III will show why both traditionalist and
contractarian explanations for fiduciary law are unsatisfactory. Part IV will
identify and critique the “schema” that judges apply when analyzing
questions of fiduciary obligation and discuss other issues of cognition. Part
V will evaluate the modern, statutory and contractual form of fiduciary
obligation in light of changes in the law and the economy and in light of
design issues.
I.

HOW EQUITY SHAPED FIDUCIARY OBLIGATION

Fiduciary obligation is one of the oldest concepts in American law to
survive today in recognizable form. The original fiduciaries — trustees,
administrators, and bailees — have origins stretching back hundreds of
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years.6 “The ‘use’ emerged during the twelfth and thirteenth centuries in
England, and the trust developed over the fourteenth through seventeenth
centuries.”7 Fiduciary obligations date back at least to the fifteenth century
and were originally principally applied in what came to be the trust context.8
Early trust law development was heavily influenced by the needs of a device
used for holding and transferring land within families because that was the
source of most wealth at the time.9 Trusteeship was viewed as an honorary,
not a mercenary, position.10 Langbein characterizes the trustees of the time
as “gentlemen trustees” with few powers, few skills, and few duties beyond
“lending their names for a conveyancing device.”11 This was feasible
because of the relatively simplicity of trust assets and administration, again
because trusts held real property.
It was courts of equity, not of law, that originally developed fiduciary
law. The English Court of Chancery was originally not a court in the sense
that it did not decide cases.12 Rather, it issued writs needed to sue in royal
courts.13 But the Court of Chancery over time increasingly became viewed
as an alternative to the royal courts when relief through those courts was not
available.14 Accordingly, a body of procedure grew up around the
Chancellor and Court of the Chancery, but it was a much more limited
6. Frankel, supra note 4, at 795 (first citing 1 A. SCOTT, THE LAW OF TRUSTS §1 (3d ed.
1967); then citing 2 F. POLLOCK & F. MAITLAND, THE HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 155 (2d ed.
1898); and then citing 2 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *395–96).
7. Id. at 805 (citing 1 A. SCOTT, THE LAW OF TRUSTS §§1.3–1.4 (3d ed. 1967)).
8. See Henry E. Smith, Why Fiduciary Law is Equitable, in PHILOSOPHICAL
FOUNDATIONS OF FIDUCIARY LAW 263, 263 (Andrew S. Gold & Paul B. Miller eds., 2014)
(“In particular by the fifteenth century many of the complaints were against “foeffees,”
persons who held legal title for the benefit of another in a proto-trust (a “use,” usually for the
purpose of avoiding the tax-like feudal incidents that would be owed the lord on an
intergenerational transfer).”).
9. John H. Langbein, Questioning the Trust Law Duty of Loyalty: Sole Interest or Best
Interest?, 114 YALE L.J. 929, 940 (2005).
10. FRANCIS WILLIAMS SANDERS, AN ESSAY ON THE NATURE AND LAWS OF USES AND
TRUSTS 256 (London, E. & R. Brooke 1791).
11. Langbein, supra note 9, at 940–41 (citing John H. Langbein, The Contractarian
Basis of the Law of Trusts, 105 YALE L.J. 625, 632–42 (1995)).
12. Sam Bray, A Student’s Guide to the Meanings of “Equity,” OPEN SCIENCE
FRAMEWORK, 4 (2016), https://osf.io/9vrjx/ [https://perma.cc/ZL4S-58NQ].
13. Id. at 4.
14. See 6 SIR JOHN BAKER, THE OXFORD HISTORY OF THE LAWS OF ENGLAND, 1483–1558
174 (2003) (“[A] party sometimes required a remedy in conscience when none was available
at common law.”). But see Samuel L. Bray, The Supreme Court and the New Equity, 68
VAND. L. REV. 997, 1005 (2015) (“[P]laintiffs, in order to obtain an equitable remedy, must
first show that they have ‘no adequate remedy at law,’ sometimes called the ‘irreparable injury
rule.’ The adequacy requirement is old, and it once served at least one clear purpose: when
there was only a single English chancellor, he could avoid being overwhelmed by refusing to
give relief where the law courts could do so adequately.”) (citations omitted).
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procedure than that available in royal, or common law, courts.15 “[C]ase
specificity” and “moral reasoning” were hallmarks of Court of Chancery
reasoning.16 Moral reasoning was so central to its reasoning that equity
courts were referred to as “courts of conscience” and the chancellor was
referred to as “the keeper of the king’s conscience.”17
Because equitable courts had little to no fact-finding ability, fiduciary
rules were tailored to avoid the need for fact-finding.18 Hence, for example,
the “no further inquiry” rule in trust administration.19 Under the no further
inquiry rule, courts will not examine the fairness or benefit to the beneficiary
of a conflicted transaction by the trustee.20 Once it is determined that the
transaction is conflicted, there will be no further inquiry. The rationale
behind a refusal to examine whether conflicted transactions are in the
beneficiary’s best interest becomes apparent when you consider that equity
courts did not have any real ability to perform a further inquiry.
Those procedural limitations persisted for centuries. The English Court
of Chancery’s fact-finding procedures were “profoundly defective” into the
nineteenth century, with no provisions for confrontation or crossexamination of witnesses or for demeanor evidence.21 The efforts to reform
equitable procedure stretched from the 1820s to the 1930s and occurred both
in England and in the United States.22
Equity courts crossed the Atlantic. The Delaware Constitution, for
example, prohibits the Delaware legislature from limiting its equity court’s
jurisdiction to less than that of the High Court of Chancery of Great Britain.23

15. Cf. Langbein, supra note 9, at 945–47 (describing the limitations of early equitable
fact-finding and reform efforts) (citations omitted).
16. Bray, supra note 12, at 5.
17. Henry Smith, supra note 8, at 263.
18. Cf. id. at 276 (“[T]he no further inquiry rule has a purpose beyond making up for
historically bad fact finding procedures.”).
19. Cf. Langbein, supra note 9, at 945–47 (describing the limitations of early equitable
fact-finding and reform efforts) (citations omitted).
20. Id. at 931–32.
21. Id. at 945–46 (relying on 3 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *373, *442–55;
JOHN P. DAWSON, A HISTORY OF LAY JUDGES 154-59 (1960); 9 WILLIAM HOLDSWORTH, A
HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 353–69 (3d ed. 1944); A.V. DICEY, LECTURES ON THE RELATION
BETWEEN LAW AND PUBLIC OPINION IN ENGLAND DURING THE NINETEENTH CENTURY 90–91
(1914); Patrick Devlin, Jury Trial of Complex Cases: English Practice at the Time of the
Seventh Amendment, 80 COLUM. L. REV. 43, 59 (1980)).
22. Id. at 947 (relying on Michael Lobban, Preparing for Fusion: Reforming the
Nineteenth-Century Court of Chancery, Part I, 22 LAW & HIST. REV. 389, 409–14 (2004);
Stephen B. Burbank, The Rules Enabling Act of 1934, 130 U. PA. L. REV. 1015 (1982);
Stephen N. Subrin, How Equity Conquered Common Law: The Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure in Historical Perspective, 135 U. PA. L. REV. 909 (1987)).
23. DEL. CONST. art. IV, § 10. See also DuPont v. DuPont, 8 A.2d 724, 729 (Del. 1951)
(“We think the Constitutions of 1792, 1831 and 1897 intended to establish for the benefit of

PACE_FINAL (DO NOT DELETE)

690

U. OF PENNSYLVANIA JOURNAL OF BUSINESS LAW

10/1/2018 4:12 PM

[Vol. 20.3

A moral, rather than economic, view of trustees crossed with them. Early
U.S. courts expressed the view that trustees will wrong beneficiaries absent
judicial intervention. In 1844, the Illinois Supreme Court declared that
“[b]etween two conflicting interests, it is easy to foresee, and all experience
has shown whose interests will be neglected and sacrificed.”24 U.S. courts
also continued to independently develop fiduciary law. For example, the
Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts replaced the existing “‘legal-list’
rule” governing trustee investment of trust assets with “a more flexible
‘prudent-investor’ standard.”25
From trusts, fiduciary obligation spread to many different types of
relationships. Fiduciary obligations in the trustee-beneficiary relationship
date back at least to 1536.26 Fiduciary obligations in the principal-agent
relationship date back to the end of the eighteenth century.27 Fiduciary
obligations in the executor- and administrator-estate, conservator- and legal
guardian-ward, and lawyer-client contexts all have a long history.28 In
Delaware, corporate derivative actions are a “judicially-created doctrine”
and “creature[s] of equity.”29 Both the corporate form and corporate
derivative standing in Delaware pre-date the Delaware General Corporation
Law statutes.30
Even for fiduciary relationships with their roots in equity, judges have
upheld some types of modifications or restrictions of fiduciary obligations.
For example, an express provision in a trust agreement governs over the duty
of loyalty, an express provision in a partnership agreement may waive the
duty not to compete with the partnership, and an attorney’s client may waive
the people of the state a tribunal to administer the remedies and principles of equity. . . . Its
result is to establish by the Judiciary Article of the Constitution the irreducible minimum of
the judiciary.”).
24. Thorp v. McCullum, 6 Ill. 614, 626 (1844).
25. Jeffrey J. Rachlinski, Heuristics and Biases in the Courts: Ignorance or Adaption?,
79 OR. L. REV. 61, 74-75 (2000) (citing Harvard College v. Amory, 26 Mass. (9 Pick.) 446
(1830)).
26. 1 A. SCOTT, THE LAW OF TRUSTS §1 (4th ed. 1987) (discussing the enactment of the
Statute of Uses, which prohibited uses that did not impose a duty on the trustee).
27. Frankel, supra note 4, at 795 (citing Charles Claflin Allen, Agent and Servant
Essentially Identical, 28 AM. L. REV. 9, 18 n.1 (1894)).
28. See, e.g., Weksler v. Collins, 317 Ill. 132, 145 (1925) (labeling executors,
administrators, guardians, and conservators as fiduciaries); Shearman v. Cooper, 294 Ill. 314,
318 (1920) (categorizing administrators, executors, and attorneys as fiduciaries); Hull v. Burr,
63 Fla. 440, 441 (1912) (quoting Florida statute that lists executors and guardians among types
of fiduciaries); Fisher v. Bishop, 63 Sickels 25, 28 (N.Y. 1888) (categorizing attorneys,
guardians, and trustees as fiduciaries).
29. Schoon v. Smith, 953 A.2d 196, 201–02 (citing 13 FLETCHER ENCYCLOPEDIA OF THE
LAW OF PRIVATE CORPS. § 940, at 30 (2004); R. Franklin Balotti & Jess A. Finkelstein, 1 THE
DELAWARE LAW OF CORPS. & BUS. ORGS. §13.10, at 13–20 (3d ed. 2008)).
30. CML V, LLC v. Bax, 28 A.3d 1037, 1044 (Del. 2011).
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the right to conflict-free representation.31
It is also important to recognize that judges do continue to find fiduciary
obligations based on the status and relationship of the parties. The addition
of fiduciary obligations to the physician-patient relationship, for example, is
more modern.32 Similar fiduciary obligations were later applied to
psychiatrists.33 In 1991, the Delaware Court of Chancery found that the
directors of a corporation serving as the general partner of a limited
partnership owed fiduciary duties to the limited partnership.34 In doing so,
the Court of Chancery did not engage in statutory analysis, but instead
applied “general principles” and analogized to trust law.35 And, in 2001, a
judge ruled that a professor owed fiduciary duties to one of his students on
the basis of the authority of the professor and the vulnerability of the student,
despite the presence of an agreement between the two.36 Some courts
continue to suggest a very expansive application of fiduciary obligation
where the relationship warrants it.37 Thus, although modern fiduciary law is
more a creature of statute than equity, equity continues to play a role, and, as
I will show, should continue to play a role.

31. Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 2, at 429. Of course, even fiduciary relationships
such as these with equitable roots have come to be governed by statute, statutes that sometimes
explicitly provide for waiver. And in all three parties rely heavily on agreements.
32. See, e.g., Hammonds v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 237 F. Supp. 96, 102 (N.D. Ohio
1965) (stating that “[i]t is axiomatic that the physician-patient relationship is a fiduciary one”
after, it should be noted, looking to the relevant state statutes for an expression of public
policy); Lockett v. Goodill, 430 P.2d 589, 591 (1967) (“The relationship of patient and
physician is a fiduciary one of the highest degree. It involves every element of trust,
confidence and good faith.”).
33. See, e.g., MacDonald v. Clinger, 446 N.Y.S.2d 801, 805 (N.Y. App. Div. 1982)
(“The relationship of the parties here was one of trust and confidence out of which sprang a
duty not to disclose. Defendant’s breach was not merely a broken contractual promise but a
violation of a fiduciary responsibility to plaintiff implicit in and essential to the doctor-patient
relation.”).
34. In re USACafes, L.P. Litig., 600 A.2d 43, 48 (Del. Ch. 1991).
35. Id. at 48–49.
36. Chou v. Univ. of Chicago, 254 F.3d 1347, 1362–63 (Fed. Cir. 2001).
37. See, e.g., Charles v. Onondaga Cmty. Coll., 418 N.Y.S.2d 718, 720 (N.Y. App. Div.
1979) (“A duty extraneous to the contract often exists where the contract results in or
accompanies some relation between the parties out of which arises a duty of affirmative care
as in cases involving bailor and bailee, public carrier and passenger, innkeeper and guest,
lawyer and client, or principal and agent. Although in the case at bar there was concededly no
relationship between plaintiff and defendants other than that of parties to the contract of
employment, the absence of such relationship is not necessarily fatal to plaintiff’s claim.”)
(citations omitted).
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STATUTE AND CONTRACT’S INFLUENCE OVER FIDUCIARY
OBLIGATION

Traditional, equitable fiduciary relationships remain quite common, but
they have been overcome in importance in the economy, in case law, and in
the literature by a different sort of fiduciary relationship. While early
fiduciary obligations were primarily judge-made, as they expanded, they
were increasingly created and defined by statute. Nowhere is this truer than
in the limited liability company (LLC) context, but fiduciary obligations in
the modern corporate and partnership context are also set and defined by
statute, and statutory fiduciary relationships extend well beyond the business
organization context. The economic importance of these relationships has
surged as corporations have grown to mammoth proportions38 and the
popularity of the LLC has exploded.39 With the advent of the promise
economy, wealth transitioned from something that primarily took the form
of land to something that primarily takes the form of financial instruments
and contractual rights.40 Business disputes and bankruptcies frequently lead
to claims for breaches of fiduciary duties.41 Many of the modern leading
cases address such relationships, as does much of the modern literature.
Fiduciary obligation in the business organization context does have a
long history, although its incorporation into statutory law has been a more
recent phenomenon. Some fiduciary duties date back to the creation of

38. But see S.I. Strong, Congress & Commercial Trusts: Dealing with Diversity
Jurisdiction Post-Americold, 69 FLA L. REV. 1023, 1023 (2017) (arguing that commercial
trusts “operate as a functional equivalent to corporations[,] ‘dominate certain types of modern
business and financial transactions[,]’ . . . and play a central role in the U.S. economy, holding
trillions of dollars’ worth of assets and generating billions of dollars’ worth of annual
income”) (citations omitted).
39. See, e.g., H. Justin Pace, Contracting Out of Fiduciary Duties in LLCs: Delaware
will Lead, but will Anyone Follow?, 16 NEV. L. J. 1085, 1086 (2016) (“LLCs now account for
more business filings than corporations in twenty-nine states.”) (citing Sandra K. Miller, The
Duty of Care in the LLC: Maintaining Accountability While Minimizing Judicial Interference,
87 NEB. L. REV. 125, 132 n.23 (2008)).
40. Langbein, supra note 9, at 940 n.42 (quoting ROSCOE POUND, AN INTRODUCTION TO
THE PHILOSOPHY OF LAW 236 (1922). See also Frankel, supra note 4, at 802 (“In our society,
affluence is largely produced by interdependence . . . .”) (footnote omitted).
41. See Russell C. Silberglied, Litigating Fiduciary Duty Claims in Bankruptcy Court
and Beyond: Theory and Practical Considerations in an Evolving Environment, 10 J. BUS. &
TECH. L. 181, 181 (2015) (“Litigation against directors and officers is ubiquitous in
bankruptcy courts. Indeed, charges of director malfeasance and breach of fiduciary duty are
leveled at the outset of many bankruptcy cases . . . . [D]irector and officer litigation claims
have become ‘bankruptcy litigation.’ The reason is fairly straightforward: suits alleging
breach of fiduciary duty and the like are much more likely to be filed when a business strategy
has failed . . . .”) (footnote omitted).
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partnerships and corporations.42 Partnerships date back at least to the
thirteenth century.43 Corporations, as we know them today, date back at least
to the seventeenth century.44 Some fiduciary duties came later.45 And some
only came with the creation of new entity forms.46
Fiduciary obligations in the business organization context were not
originally created by statute.47 And, indeed, Delaware was slow in providing
explicitly for fiduciary duties in its business organization laws, only doing
so in the LLC context in 2013.48 Aspects such as the business judgment rule
were created by courts, not legislatures.49 But states steadily began to update
their business organization statutes to include fiduciary obligations. As new
entity forms were created providing for alternative business entities,
including notably the LLC, fiduciary law in the business organization
context broke free from equity and the common law and became a true body
of statutory law.
What happened, in effect, is that statute and contract were used to “bolton” fiduciary obligation in a different context. That is, the source of
fiduciary obligation did not arise from the nature of the relationship of the
parties or the external status of the parties but from the statute or contract
itself. And to extend the bolt-on analogy a bit further, the resulting law is
not only customized by bolting-on fiduciary obligation but by modifying the
contours of fiduciary obligation by statute and contract.
Courts were slow to account for the shift in fiduciary law from an
equitable basis to a statutory and contractual basis. The famous teaching

42. Frankel, supra note 4, at 795 (“In the business realm, the fiduciary duties of partners,
corporate directors, and officers originated with the formation of partnerships and
corporations.”) (footnote omitted). See also Wardell v. R.R. Co., 103 U.S. 651, 657–58
(1881) (stressing that directors owe a fiduciary duty to their company); Koehler v. Black River
Falls Iron Co., 67 U.S. 715, 720–21 (1862) (holding that directors owe a fiduciary duty to
stockholders).
43. ALAN R. BROMBERG, CRANE AND BROMBERG ON PARTNERSHIP 10-11 (1968).
44. WILLIAM MEADE FLETCHER, FLETCHER’S CYCLOPEDIA OF THE LAW OF PRIVATE
CORPORATIONS §1 (rev. perm. ed. 1974).
45. Frankel, supra note 4, at 795–96 (“[M]ajority shareholders were not subjected to
fiduciary duties until this century.”) (footnote omitted).
46. The LLC did not exist at common law and is a product of statute. CML V, LLC v.
Bax, 28 A.3d 1037, 1045 (Del. 2011).
47. See, e.g., Guth v. Loft, Inc., 5 A.2d 503, 510 (Del. 1939) (“While technically not
trustees, [corporate officers and directors] stand in a fiduciary relation to the corporation and
its stockholders.”).
48. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, § 18-1104 (West 2013) (“In any case not provided for in this
chapter, the rules of law and equity, including the rules of law and equity relating to fiduciary
duties and the law merchant, shall govern.”).
49. See Zapata Corp. v. Maldonado, 430 A.2d 779, 782 (Del. 1981) (“The ‘business
judgment’ rule is a judicial creation . . . .”).
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case Meinhard v. Salmon is an apt example.50 Meinhard and Salmon were
partners, but then-Judge Cardozo explicitly referred to trustees and courts of
equity in laying out the high duty owed. He said that a “trustee is held to
something stricter than the morals of the market place,” not a partner.51 He
referenced the “[u]ncompromising rigidity [that] has been the attitude of
courts of equity,” not courts of law.52 Having drawn that connection, he
layered on more morally inflected language. Partners owe a duty of “[n]ot
honesty alone, but rather the punctilio of an honor the most sensitive.”53
“Joint adventurers . . . owe to one another,” not the duty of loyalty, but “the
duty of the finest loyalty.”54 That loyalty must be “undivided” and not
subject to “the ‘disintegrating erosion’ of particular exception.”55 That high
standard was necessary not only to differentiate fiduciary conduct from
“forms of conduct permissible in a workaday world,” but to keep it “at a level
higher than that trodden by the crowd.”56 All of this was built on a “tradition
that is unbending and inveterate.”57 And only by refusing to make an
exception — equitable characterization notwithstanding — could Judge
Cardozo avoid consciously lowering the standard of conduct for
fiduciaries.58 Meinhard and Salman had an agreement. Cardozo ignored it.
Instead Cardozo analogized Salmon to a trustee and his own court to one of
equity, while disclaiming equity’s traditional discretion.59
Fiduciary obligations have been created by statute outside of the
business organization context. The Exchange Act of 1934 and SEC rules
made brokers and dealers the fiduciaries of their customers.60 The DoddFrank Act authorized the SEC to promulgate a uniform fiduciary standard
for investment advisors, brokers, and dealers when providing personalized
investment advice.61 The statutory power given to union leaders to represent
workers in negotiations with management brought with it fiduciary
obligations inferred by the courts.62 The Landrum-Griffin Act of 1959
50. Meinhard v. Salmon, 249 N.Y. 458 (1928).
51. Id. at 464 (emphasis added).
52. Id. (emphasis added).
53. Id.
54. Id. at 463–64 (emphasis added).
55. Id. at 464 (citation omitted).
56. Id.
57. Id.
58. Id.
59. Id. at 463–68. See also Arthur B. Laby, The Fiduciary Obligation as the Adoption
of Ends, 56 BUFFALO L. REV. 99, 114 (2008) (“Cardozo was not hobbled by the shackles of
contract—he disregarded the parties’ agreement and imposed extra-contractual fiduciary
duties instead.”).
60. Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 2, at 430.
61. 15 U.S.C. § 78o(k) (2012).
62. Frankel, supra note 4, at 796 (citing Steele v. Louisville & N.R.R. Co., 323 U.S. 192
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explicitly established duties by “officers, agents, shop stewards, and other
representatives of a labor organization” to the labor “organization and its
members as a group.”63 In 1974, Congress created a statutory fiduciary
scheme for pension and other employee benefit plans and trusts with the
Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA).64 Regulators play a
role as well. A recently vacated Department of Labor rule raised the standard
for brokers handling retirement accounts to a “best interests” standard.65
States also began modifying traditional fiduciary law by statute,
especially by adopting uniform acts. States shifted estate administration,
even by conflicted administrators, away from heavy court supervision by
statute with the adoption of the Uniform Probate Code of 1969.66 States
provided for conflicted surrogates to terminate life support by statute with
the adoption of the Uniform Health-Care Decisions Act.67 States abrogated
common law fiduciary obligation and allowed limited waiver of fiduciary
duties for agents operating under a durable power of attorney with the
adoption of the 2006 Uniform Power of Attorney Act, already adopted by 24
states.68 States abrogated the sole interest rule — allowing it to be abridged
by the terms of the trust — by statute with the Uniform Trust Code.69 State

(1944); Hines v. Anchor Motor Freight, Inc., 424 U.S. 554, 564 (1976)). See also Morrissey
v. Curran, 423 F.2d 393, 398–99 (2d Cir. 1970) (holding that legitimizing a breach of duty by
amending the union’s constitution or bylaws was “inconsistent with the aims and purposes of
the Fair Management Reporting and Disclosure Act.”).
63. 29 U.S.C. §501(a) (2010).
64. 29 U.S.C. §§1001–1461 (2012). See also Langbein, supra note 9, at 950 (“Congress
based ERISA on the law of trusts.”).
65. Chamber of Commerce v. U.S. Dep’t of Labor, No. 17-10238, at *26 (5th Cir. Mar.
15, 2018) (vacating the fiduciary rule because, for example, its “interpretation of ‘investment
advice fiduciary’ fatally conflicts with the statutory text and contemporary understandings”).
66. See Langbein, supra note 9, at 941 (“Across the second half of the twentieth century,
there has been a strong movement away from such court-supervised wealth transfers on death,
on account of the expense, nuisance, and delay inherent in the procedure. The animating
reform of the Uniform Probate Code of 1969 was the shift to unsupervised probate
administration.”) (citations omitted).
67. See id. at 942 (“The Uniform Health-Care Decisions Act empowers the spouse or
another near relative of an incapacitated person to serve as the so-called surrogate, who
decides whether to terminate the person’s life support. Although this surrogate is empowered
to make a life-or-death decision to withhold treatment, he or she typically has an adverse
financial interest in the patient’s affairs . . . . The legislation reflects a cost-benefit
determination that the danger of the conflicted surrogate using his or her authority to
extinguish the patient prematurely is outweighed by the benefits of empowering the person
most likely to know the patient’s wishes and to have the patient’s best interest at heart.”)
(citation omitted).
68. UNIF. POWER OF ATTORNEY ACT § 115 (2006). State enactment numbers per the
Uniform Law Commission website, http://www.uniformlaws.org/Act.aspx?title=
Power%20of%20Attorney [https://perma.cc/XR5V-V84K] (last visited on August 14, 2017).
69. Langbein, supra note 9, at 938; UNIF. TRUST CODE § 802(b)(1) (2010).
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legislatures changed the rule regarding trustee investment of trust assets after
the Great Depression by adopting the prudent investor rule70 and then
updated the rule again to incorporate modern portfolio theory with the
Uniform Prudent Investor Act, promulgated in 1994 and adopted in all but
seven states.71
Until recently, Delaware did not explicitly provide for whether LLC
managers owed duties to the LLC.72 The Delaware Court of Chancery
addressed the issue in Auriga Capital Corp. v. Gatz Props., LLC.73
Chancellor Strine looked to the language of Delaware’s LLC Act.74 But he
also used equitable reasoning. He noted that “the rules of equity apply in the
LLC context by statutory mandate,” going on to look at the nature of the
manager’s relationship with the LLC, including the discretion invested in the
manager.75 Chancellor Strine ultimately concluded, albeit in dicta, that
“default fiduciary duties do exist in the LLC context.”76
As early as 1942, a court ruled that majority shareholders’ and directors’
duties to the corporation could be restricted by the corporate documents.77
Legislatures have gone so far as to allow waiver of the duty of loyalty.78
Most notably, the Delaware legislature amended the Delaware Corporation

70. Rachlinski, supra note 25, at 75.
71. Id. at 77 (citing UNIF. PRUDENT INVESTOR ACT 2(b) (1994); John H. Langbein, The
Uniform Prudent Investor Act and the Future of Trust Investing, 81 IOWA L. REV. 641, 643
(1996)); State enactment numbers per the Uniform Law Commission website, http://www.u
niformlaws.org/Act.aspx?title=Prudent%20Investor%20Act [https://perma.cc/8G93-Y33T]
(last visited on Feb. 28, 2018). In at least one state, the community property statute made a
husband “a fiduciary in respect to his wife’s interest in the community . . . .” Vai v. Bank of
Am. Nat’l Trust & Savings Ass’n, 56 Cal. 2d 329, 336–37 (1961).
72. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, § 18-1104 (West 2013).
73. Auriga Capital Corp. v. Gatz Props., LLC, 40 A.3d 839, 849 (Del. Ch. 2012).
74. Id. at 850, 852.
75. Id. at 850–51. The Delaware Supreme Court criticized the Court of Chancery’s
opinion on the issue of default fiduciary duties as dicta. Gatz Props., LLC v. Auriga Capital
Corp., 59 A.3d 1206, 1214, 1218 (Del. 2012).
76. Auriga Capital Corp., 40 A.3d at 849–56.
77. Everett v. Phillips, 288 N.Y. 227, 232–33 (1942) (holding that the majority
shareholders/directors did not breach their duties to the corporation by causing and
participating in an interested transaction, stressing that “in determining whether those who
have power to control the corporation have committed a wrong either to the corporation or to
its stockholders, the corporate capital structure, the certificate of incorporation, and the
corporate constitution or by-laws may be factors of great weight; for, within limits prescribed
by law, these define to whom the power of control is entrusted, its scope and the manner in
which it must be exercised”).
78. See, e.g., UNIFORM POWER OF ATTORNEY ACT § 114(b) (2006); RESTATEMENT
(THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 78, cmt. C(2) (2007); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 8.06 (2006)
(allowing waivers of the duty of loyalty). See also Pace, supra 39, at 1095–133 (detailing
LLC statutory provisions allowing waiver and LLC and LP case law upholding waiver
provisions).
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Act to allow waivers of the corporate opportunity doctrine.79 Even where
waiver was not allowed, the prohibition was typically rooted in the language
of the statute, not in equity.80 And when the Delaware Supreme Court
suggested that the Delaware Limited Partnership (LP) Act did not allow the
elimination, rather than just limitation, of fiduciary duties,81 the Delaware
legislature responded by amending the Delaware LP Act to add the word
“eliminate.”82 Waivers have proven quite popular.83 Principles of equity
have, however, crept back into business organization law from time to time,84
and shareholder suits for breach of fiduciary duty are still sometimes
considered equitable85 and in Delaware are still brought before a court of

79. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 122(17) (2018). At least eight states have followed
Delaware’s lead. KAN. STAT. ANN. § 17-6102(q) (2017); MD. CODE ANN., CORPS. & ASS’NS
§ 2-103(15) (West 2014); MO. ANN. STAT. § 351.385(16) (2016); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. §
78.070(8) (West 2017); N.J. STAT. ANN. 14A:3-1(q) (West 2017); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 18,
§ 1016(17) (West 2017); TEX. BUS. ORGS. CODE ANN. § 2.101(21) (West 2017); WASH. REV.
CODE ANN. § 23B.02.020(5)(k) (West 2017).
80. See, e.g., Investment Company Act of 1940 § 17(i), 15 U.S.C. § 80a-17(i) (2010)
(barring certain types of contractual protections against liability for investment advisors);
Landrum-Griffin Act §501(a), 29 U.S.C. §501(a) (2010) (“A general exculpatory provision
in the constitution and bylaws of such a labor organization or a general exculpatory resolution
of a governing body purporting to relieve any such person of liability for breach of the duties
declared by this section shall be void as against public policy.”); ERISA, 29 U.S.C. § 1110(a)
(2012) (“Except as [otherwise provided], any provision in an agreement or instrument which
purports to relieve a fiduciary from responsibility or liability for any responsibility, obligation,
or duty under this part shall be void as against public policy.”).
81. Gotham Partners, L.P. v. Hallwood Realty Partners, L.P., 817 A.2d 160, 167–68
(Del. 2002).
82. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, § 17-1101(d) (2014). The Delaware legislature updated its
LLC Act with the same language that year. DEL. CODE. ANN. tit. 6, § 18-1101(c) (2014).
83. See Gabriel Rauterberg & Eric Talley, Contracting Out of the Fiduciary Duty of
Loyalty: An Empirical Analysis of Corporate Opportunity Waivers, 117 COLUM. L. REV. 1075,
1123 (2017) (estimating from securities filings that over 6,000 of roughly 10,000 identified
corporate filings disclose a limitation or waiver of the corporate opportunities doctrine);
Michelle M. Harner & Jamie Marincic, The Naked Fiduciary, 54 ARIZ. L. REV. 879, 910
(2012) (finding the operating agreements of a majority of publicly traded LLCs modified or
eliminated the duty of loyalty).
84. See, e.g., Roland Int’l Corp. v. Najjar, 407 A.2d 1032, 1036 (Del. 1979) (holding
that majority shareholder had a fiduciary obligation to minority shareholders that arose “from
long-standing principles of equity and is superimposed on many sections of the Corporation
Law . . . .”), overruled by Weinberger v. UPO, Inc., 457 A.2d 701, 715 (Del. 1983); Pappas
v. Tzolis, 982 N.E.2d 576, 579 (N.Y. 2012) (ignoring a NY statute allowing for waiver in
favor of a broader equitable rule that waivers of fiduciary duty are only enforceable where the
releasing party is sophisticated and “the fiduciary relationship is no longer one of
unquestioning trust”) (citing Centro Empresarial Cempresa S.A. v. America Movil, S.A.B. de
C.V., 952 N.E.2d 995 (N.Y. 2011)).
85. See Rachlinski, supra note 25, at 95 (“In most jurisdictions, suits by shareholders
against corporate officers must be brought in equity, just like actions by beneficiaries against
trustees.”).
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equity.86
Parties have taken advantage of this new, greater freedom with court
approval in many states. In Fisk Ventures, L.L.C. v. Segal, the Delaware
Court of Chancery enforced an LLC operating agreement that disclaimed
any fiduciary duties not expressly set forth elsewhere in the operating
agreement and that did not provide for duties in any other provision.87 In
Broussard v. Tipton, a Louisiana court upheld the trial court’s grant of
summary judgment on a breach of fiduciary duty claim on the basis of the
LLC’s indemnity provision, which, in the court’s view, clearly eliminated
any liability defendants may have had.88 In Clancy v. King, Maryland’s
highest court held that the relevant limited partnership agreement expressly
allowed the author Tom Clancy (a general partner) to compete with the
limited partnership.89 In Wayne County Employees’ Retirement System v.
Corti, the Delaware Court of Chancery refused to grant declaratory
judgment, rejecting, at least at that stage, the plaintiff’s argument that a
provision in the certificate of incorporation at issue was ineffective in
limiting the corporate opportunity doctrine because it did not “specify” the
renounced opportunities.90
Parties in various types of business relationships have taken advantage
of the ability to create and define fiduciary duties as well as to restrict them.
In Gatz Properties, LLC v. Auriga Capital Corp., the LLC operating
agreement provided that conflicted transactions must have terms comparable
to an arms-length transaction.91 In response to a conflicted transaction, the

86. See, e.g., William T. Quillen and Michael Hanrahan, A Short History of the Court of
Chancery 1792–1992 (1993), http://courts.delaware.gov/chancery/history.aspx [https://p
erma.cc/G55X-X6Z6] (last visited Feb. 28, 2018) (discussing the Delaware Court of
Chancery’s history of deciding breach of fiduciary duty cases).
87. Fisk Ventures, L.L.C. v. Segal, No. 3017-CC, 2008 WL 1961156, at *9–10 (Del. Ch.
May 7, 2008).
88. Broussard v. Tipton, No. 2013 CA 1268, 2014 WL 3559371, at *1–2 (La. Ct. App.
Apr. 24, 2014).
89. Clancy v. King, 954 A.2d 1092, 1095, 1101 (Md. 2008).
90. Wayne County Employees’ Retirement System v. Corti, No. 3534-CC, 2009 WL
2219260, at *18 (July 24, 2009) (unpublished). See also In re Morton’s Restaurant Group,
Inc. Shareholders Litig., 74 A.3d 656, 663–72 (Del. Ch. 2013) (holding that only a failure to
act loyally or in good faith would preclude reliance on the exculpatory provision in the
company’s certificate of incorporation).
91. Gatz Properties, LLC v. Auriga Capital Corp., 59 A.3d 1206, 1212–13 (Del. 2012)
(The relevant provision stated that “Neither the Manager nor any other Member shall be
entitled to cause the Company to enter into any amendment of any of the Initial Affiliate
Agreements which would increase the amounts paid by the Company pursuant thereto, or
enter into any additional agreements with affiliates on terms and conditions which are less
favorable to the Company than the terms and conditions of similar agreements which could
then be entered into with arms-length third parties, without the consent of a majority of the
non-affiliated Members (such majority to be deemed to be the holders of 66-2/3% of all
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plaintiffs sued for both breach of contract and breach of fiduciary duties.92
The Supreme Court of Delaware upheld the ruling by the Court of Chancery
that the operating agreement imposed fiduciary duties, specifically the entire
fairness standard, adding that “[t]o impose fiduciary standards of conduct as
a contractual matter, there is no requirement in Delaware that an LLC
agreement use magic words, such as ‘entire fairness’ or ‘fiduciary duties.’”93
Limited partners do not typically owe fiduciary duties to the respective
limited partnership, but in Cantor Fitzgerald, L.P. v. Cantor the Delaware
Court of Chancery enforced a provision in the limited partnership agreement
establishing just such a duty.94 Both the Delaware LLC Act and the
Delaware LP Act explicitly provide for the expansion of fiduciary duties.95
These relationships have economic bases different from that of
traditional fiduciary relationships. The former tend to be contractual, armslength, bargained-for, and subject to market discipline. The latter tend to be
information asymmetrical, involve large power disparities, and touch on
important matters of public policy. That is, the needs and circumstances of
fiduciary relationships in business organization law are very different than
those of traditional fiduciary duties. Traditional fiduciary relationships have
been depicted as vertical, with the beneficiary taking an inferior role and the
fiduciary taking a dominant role.96 Modern fiduciaries in the business
organization context, on the other hand, occupy relationships relative to their
firms that more closely resemble the horizontal relationships of nonInterests which are not held by affiliates of the person or entity that would be a party to the
proposed agreement).”).
92. Id. at 1212.
93. Id. at 1213. But see D. Gordon Smith, Contractually Adopted Fiduciary Duty, U.
ILL. L. REV. 1783, 1784 (2014) (arguing that “the Delaware Supreme Court was confused
about the proper relationship between fiduciary and contractual duties” and that “the fiduciary
duty of loyalty, properly understood, cannot be adopted contractually”).
94. Canton Fitzgerald, L.P. v. Cantor, 724 A.2d 571, 574, 582 (Del. Ch. 1998) (stating
that upholding bargained-for fiduciary duties contained in limited partnership agreements is
crucial to the orderly management and economic success of those limited partnerships).
95. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, §18-1101(c) (2014) (“To the extent that, at law or in equity,
a member or manager or other person has duties (including fiduciary duties) to a limited
liability company or to another member or manager or to another person that is a party to or
is otherwise bound by a limited liability company agreement, the member’s or manager’s or
other person’s duties may be expanded or restricted or eliminated by provisions in the limited
liability company agreement; provided, that the limited liability company agreement may not
eliminate the implied contractual covenant of good faith and fair dealing.”); § 17-1101(d)
(“To the extent that, at law or in equity, a partner or other person has duties (including
fiduciary duties) to a limited partnership or to another partner or to another person that is a
party to or is otherwise bound by a partnership agreement, the partner’s or other person’s
duties may be expanded or restricted or eliminated by provisions in the partnership agreement;
provided that the partnership agreement may not eliminate the implied contractual covenant
of good faith and fair dealing.”).
96. Alexander, supra note 3, at 775.
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fiduciary contracting parties.97
Fiduciary law, then, has developed into two different bodies of law.
Each is somewhat confusingly referred to as fiduciary law under the existing
case law and literature. Not only are explanations of both the traditionalist
and contractarian camps in the literature incomplete, the third camp that
argues that fiduciary law is atomistic and forms no coherent body of law is
incorrect.98 Nor are these merely the same concept with different bases, but
rather two distinct concepts. Much of the confusion in the literature and case
law can be clarified by understanding the development of those two concepts
and by examining them through the lens of cognitive theory. This Article
will show how cognitive limitations hamper judges in evaluating questions
of modern, statutory and contractual fiduciary obligation and why the
modern, statutory and contractual approach is usually the best available
approach.
III.

UNSATISFYING EXISTING EXPLANATIONS

There is a large body of scholarly literature on fiduciary law. Fiduciary
obligation has a reputation as one of the more elusive concepts in AngloAmerican law,”99 but scholars in the field can be roughly divided into two
camps: traditionalist (or moralist or formalist or anti-contractarian) and
contractarian (or contextualist).100
The traditionalists want business organization fiduciaries to act like
traditional, equitable fiduciaries. They get the fiduciary concept right, but
97. Id.
98. See, e.g., Deborah A. DeMott, Beyond Metaphor: An Analysis of Fiduciary
Obligation, 37 DUKE L.J. 879, 915 (1988) (“One could justifiably conclude that the law of
fiduciary obligation is in significant respects atomistic.”) (footnote omitted). Mistakenly
labeling fiduciary law as atomistic is perhaps due to both a failure to appreciate the dual nature
of fiduciary law and a failure to understand that its traditional roots are in equity, with all the
flexibility that entails. The statutory and contractual basis of the other type of fiduciary law
also allows for tremendous variation.
99. See, e.g., Robert Sitkoff, An Economic Theory of Fiduciary Law, in PHILOSOPHICAL
FOUNDATIONS OF FIDUCIARY LAW 19 (Andrew S. Gold & Paul B. Miller eds., 2014) (“This
point explains the purported elusiveness of fiduciary doctrine”).
100. See, e.g., Smith, supra note 8, at 282 (“[C]ommentary is split between
contextualizers and contractarians on the one hand and formalists and moralizers on the
other.”); Kelli A. Alces, The Fiduciary Gap, 40 J. OF CORP. L. 351, 353–54 (2016) (labeling
the “two dominant perspectives” as contractarians and anti-contractarians). This article is
limited to U.S. law and its English antecedents, but a similar debate is taking place among
Canadian commentators. Compare John Howard, Fiduciary Relations in Corporate Law, 19
CANADIAN BUS. L. J. 1 (1991) (explaining contractarian views of fiduciary law) with Brian R.
Cheffins, Law, Economics, and Morality: Contracting Out of Corporate Law Fiduciary
Duties, 19 CANADIAN BUS. L. J. 28 (1991) (advocating a moralist view of fiduciary law by
highlighting the limitations of the contractarian view).
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apply it where it does not belong. The contractarians recognize that fiduciary
duties in the business organization context are contractual in effect, if not in
fact, but fail to appreciate the dissimilar nature of fiduciary obligations in
different circumstances. Neither concept (equitable or statutory-contractual)
can fully explain modern fiduciary law. There are fiduciary obligations that
spring solely from equitable roots — i.e., based on the relationship of the
parties and not any statutory or contractual basis. And there are fiduciary
obligations that arise absent any source in equity. For example, directors of
a corporation are fiduciaries of the corporation and its shareholders,101 but
are not the agents of either.102 Thus, the traditionalist narrative is incomplete
because fiduciary obligations often arise where there is no relationship of the
sort creating fiduciary obligations in equity.103 The contractarian narrative is
incomplete because fiduciary obligations can and do arise without any
contractual or statutory basis.104
A. Limits of Traditionalist Arguments
The traditionalists look more to the roots of fiduciary obligation. They
tend to view fiduciary obligation in terms of equity or the common law. They
think of and talk about fiduciary obligations in moral terms and argue they
have a moral component. Additionally, they think of and talk about fiduciary
obligation as its own body of law rather than a subset of another body of law,
they are more likely to reject arguments that fiduciary obligations can or
should be subject to limitation by agreement among the parties, and their
literature tends to have its academic foundations in philosophy.
Relationship between parties over intent. DeMott defines fiduciary
duties as “conventionally based on the existence of a relationship of trust and
confidence when one party undertakes to give advice to another in more than
101. Marhart, Inc. v. Calmat Co., CA. No. 11,820, 1992 WL 212587 (Del. Ch. Apr. 22,
1992) (reported in 18 DEL. J. CORP. L. 330 (1992)) (“Delaware directors are fiduciaries.”).
102. Mgmt. Techs., Inc. v. Morris, 961 F. Supp. 640, 651 (S.D.N.Y. 1997) (holding that
corporate directors are not agents of the corporation); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY
§1.01 cmt. f(2) (Am. Law Inst. 2006) (stating that corporate directors are not agents of the
corporation’s shareholders). But see CAL. CORPS. CODE §317(a) (defining “agent” to include
corporate directors).
103. See, e.g., Alces, supra note 100, at 364 (“[P]arties can voluntarily import the body
of fiduciary law to fill the gaps in their contracts.”).
104. See id. at 363–64 (“Contractarians assert that all fiduciary relationships must be
based on a voluntary interaction that at least resembles a contract, and anti-contractarians
point out that such a strict model fails to explain the many cases where fiduciary duties are
applied without an express agreement or a contract containing a fiduciary term.”). See also
Laby, supra note 59, at 110–29 (critiquing the limitations of the contractual approach);
Frankel, supra note 4, at 813 (“[F]iduciary relations are not necessarily contractual.”)
(footnote omitted).
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an incidental or casual manner.”105 In her article rooting fiduciary duties in
expectations of loyalty, DeMott gives as an example where the nature of the
fiduciary relationship or the role occupied by the fiduciary or entrustor
prevents self-protection by the entrustor.106 Moreover, DeMott sees
entrustors’ expectations of loyal conduct as justifiable on the basis of the
similarity of their relationship with conventional fiduciary relationships.107
Frankel argues that judges look not to the intent of the parties, but rather to
“whether the arrangement formed by the parties meets the criteria for
classification as fiduciary” in deciding if fiduciary duties apply.108 Gordon
Smith claims that judges usually impose the fiduciary duty of loyalty without
regard to any contract.109 And traditionalists accept that fiduciary
relationships may be formed even absent the agreement and intent of the
parties.110
Power imbalances. Those types of relationships tend to be marked by
power imbalances, a major point of concern for traditionalist scholars. The
trustee-beneficiary and executor-beneficiary are vertical relationships that
resemble master-servant and parent-child relationships.111
Those
relationships involve structural power imbalances because the subordinate
party is usually passive and their exit options are highly constrained and
because the intimacy of the relationship disguises abuse by the dominant
party.112 There are often wildly different degrees of knowledge and
sophistication between the parties.113
105. Deborah A. DeMott, Breach of Fiduciary Duty: On Justifiable Expectations of
Loyalty & Their Consequences, 48 ARIZ. L.R. 925, 950 (2006) (emphasis added). See also
Tamar Frankel, Fiduciary Law in the Twenty-First Century, 91 B.U. L. Rev. 1289 (2011)
(arguing fiduciary relationships are rooted in trust). But see Alces, supra note 100, at 377
(“[W]here there are no explicit fiduciary duties, and the parties have not arranged themselves
in a kind of relationship that is traditionally considered fiduciary, it may be impossible to
determine which party is the trusting party and which is the trusted party until one of them is
disappointed.”).
106. DeMott, supra note 105 at 945. There is no single term in general use for the
counterpart to the fiduciary. Where a general term is needed, I will borrow “entrustor” from
Tamar Frankel’s Fiduciary Law, supra note 4.
107. Demott, supra note 105, at 945.
108. Frankel, supra note 4, at 821.
109. Gordon Smith, supra note 93, at 1787.
110. DeMott, supra, note 98, at 887 (“[O]nce a court concludes that a particular
relationship has a fiduciary character, the parties’ manifest intention does not control their
obligations to each other as dispositively as it does under a contract analysis.”). See also
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §874 cmt. a (1979) (defining a fiduciary relationship as
existing “between two persons when one of them is under a duty to act for or give advice for
the benefit of another upon matters within the scope of the relation.”) (citing RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF TRUSTS §2 (1959)).
111. Alexander, supra note 3, at 777.
112. Id.
113. Williams, supra note 100, at 361 (citing Tamar Frankel, supra note 4, at 833;
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Potential for opportunism. With those power imbalances come the
potential for opportunism. According to Weinrib, that the entrustor is at the
mercy of the fiduciary’s discretion is the hallmark of fiduciary
relationships.114 Henry Smith sees fiduciary relationships as carrying
abnormal potential for opportunism.115 Traditionalists fear that, absent
judges taking a more equitable role, opportunists will take advantage of the
judicial process.116 They see that potential for opportunism as a justification
for judicial intervention.117 And they see this as endemic. For example,
Frankel argues that “all fiduciary relations give rise to the problem of abuse
of power,”118 and Gordon Smith argues that entrustors “are always
vulnerable to opportunism.”119
Traditionalist scholars also tie judicial intervention very closely to that
problem of abuse of power. For example, Frankel argues that judicial
intervention in the union official-employee relationship should be calibrated
based on union members’ ability to control their officials and thus prevent
abuse.120 Traditionalists are leery of “loosening traditional stringent rules
about fiduciary duties” — for example, by allowing for waiver in
organizational documents — because of those equitable, anti-opportunism
roots.121
Expression of social norms. Leslie characterizes fiduciary obligation
as an expression of social norms that would be stripped of moral force in an
opt-out scheme.122 Those effects will in some circumstances be mitigated by
Margaret M. Blair & Lynn A. Stout, Trust, Trustworthiness, and the Behav. Found, of Corp.
L., 149 U. PA. L. REV. 1735, 1739–40 (2001)).
114. Ernest J. Weinrib, The Fiduciary Obligation, 25 U. TORONTO L.J. 1, 7 (1975).
115. Smith, supra note 8, at 262.
116. Id. at 264.
117. Frankel, supra note 4, at 816 (“Because the entrustor cannot satisfactorily protect
himself . . . the law must intervene to protect him from abuse of power[.]”).
118. Frankel, supra note 4, at 807 (emphasis added).
119. Gordon Smith, supra note 93, at 1786 (citations omitted) (emphasis added).
120. Frankel, supra note 4, at 807.
121. Henry Smith, supra note 8, at 275.
122. See Melanie B. Leslie, Trusting Trustees: Fiduciary Duties and the Limits of Default
Rules, 94 GEO. L. J. 67, 89 (2005) (“[F]iduciary duty law supports and reinforces social norms
that require trustees to act with care and to refrain from self-dealing. Characterizing fiduciary
duties as optional strips fiduciary duties of moral force and would, over time, weaken the
social norms embodied in those duties.”). See also Alces, supra note 100, at 373 (“The
Delaware Supreme Court’s use of moral rhetoric to admonish corporate directors may indeed
serve an expressive function of setting norms for best practices and ways in which those
directors ought to behave.”) (citing Edward B. Rock & Michael L. Wachter, Islands of
Conscious Power: Law, Norms, and the Self-Governing Corporation, 149 U. PA. L. REV.
1619, 1696 (2001)). This view is not irreconcilable with a limited modification regime if we
recognize that sometimes fiduciary obligations represent social norms and sometimes they do
not. See also supra Part VI (discussing how the imperfect incentives provided by contractual
penalties suggest that morality and social norms should still play a role in fiduciary law).
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market forces.123 Frankel, on the other hand, sees fiduciary obligation as
replacing weakened social controls.124 But Frankel also sees a direct tension
between market pressures and moral intuition in the fiduciary context.125
Equitable roots. The traditionalists not only think of fiduciary
obligation in moral-philosophical terms but also in terms of its equitable
roots. What concerns us here is not the law-equity divide and attendant
debate. But the remnants of the law-equity divide have ramifications for
modern fiduciary obligation. Equity has a long, close history with moral
language. Equity can fairly be defined not just as “[t]he doctrines and
remedies developed in the English courts of equity” but also as “[a] moral
reading of the law.”126 Henry Smith not only categorizes fiduciary law as
equitable but as “perhaps the most important and characteristic branch” of
equity.127 To Smith, fiduciary law counters opportunism by acting as a
“safety valve.”128
The equitable roots of fiduciary obligation show in part why it is not an
entirely incoherent, atomistic body of law, as some scholars have
maintained.129 On the contrary, according to Henry Smith, equity’s
approaches, which are status- or fact-based, will not produce “a single
principle, let alone a rule,” because different statuses and facts produce
different types of opportunism.130
Moral Basis. Henry Smith, in explicitly tying fiduciary law to equity,
also ties equity to “natural law and natural justice.”131 As such, it is infused
with moral norms.132 The danger of misbehavior is inherent because
entrustment and vulnerability are part and parcel to the relationship.133 But
as Smith notes, fiduciary law is broader than general equity because a court
will find a violation of fiduciary duty where there is no disproportionate
hardship nor intent.134 In other words, “fiduciary law is moral but not

123. Leslie, supra note 122, at 92.
124. Frankel, supra note 4, at 802–03.
125. Id. at 815 (“[A] market for fiduciary services reduces the moral stature and the public
service image of professional fiduciaries.”).
126. Bray, supra note 12, at 1.
127. Henry Smith, supra note 8, at 261.
128. Id. at 262.
129. See, e.g., DeMott, supra note 98, at 915 (“One could justifiably conclude that the
law of fiduciary obligation is in significant respects atomistic.”).
130. Henry Smith, supra note 8, at 277. Smith’s “fact-based approaches” look very much
like the status-based approaches as used in this article. E.g., “The facts in question usually
relate to one party’s vulnerability and the discretion wielded by the candidate for fiduciary.”
Id. at 278.
131. Id. at 263.
132. Id.
133. Id. at 272.
134. Id.
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unboundedly so.”135
The moral and the equitable are not unrelated. Henry Smith notes that,
like equity, “fiduciary law is often untailored and morally inflected.”136
Smith points to Judge Cardozo’s famous language in Meinhard v. Salmon as
simply “a stronger version of the morals reflected in equity.”137 Not only are
fiduciary obligations articulated in moral terms, scholars in the traditionalist
camp see fiduciary law as both fixed and mandatory.138 Frankel points to the
jurisdictional authority that ecclesiastical and equity courts historically held
over fiduciaries as a rationale for incorporating morality into fiduciary law.139
Laby views fiduciary obligation through the prism of deontological
moral theory.140 That is, whether a moral duty requires, permits, or prohibits
an act, regardless of the consequences of that act.141 Other scholars tie equity
in closely with morality.142 The potential for opportunism has been explicitly
tied to morality. It is worse from a moral perspective to injure someone who
cannot protect themselves than it is to injure someone who can.143
Limits of traditionalist arguments. Moral reasoning notwithstanding,
the traditionalists acknowledge an importantly contractual component to
fiduciary law.144 And traditionalists have admitted many of the arguments
of the contractarians. For example, there is a recognition that the entrustor
and fiduciary do not typically, or at least necessarily, enter the relationship
with unequal bargaining power — the entrustor’s vulnerability arises after
the relationship is formed.145
The strict approach that courts have traditionally taken to enforcing the
duty of loyalty is based on the vertical character of the relationship between
the property fiduciary and the beneficiary.146 Given the typically horizontal
character of fiduciary relationships in the business organization law context,
that rationale erodes. Some traditionalists acknowledge this. Henry Smith
admits that the rationale for tailoring presumptions to counter the danger of
opportunism is weaker where the danger of opportunism is not as high,
135.
136.
137.
138.
139.
140.
141.

Id. 281.
Id. at 272.
Id.
Id. at 1.
Frankel, supra note 4, at 831.
Laby, supra note 59, at 129.
Id. (citing Stephen Darwal, PHILOSOPHICAL ETHICS 81 (1998); Shelly Kagan,
NORMATIVE ETHICS 73 (1998)).
142. See Henry Smith, supra note 8, at 279 (“Common sense morality goes some way
toward cabining equity[.]”).
143. Frankel, supra note 4, at 832.
144. See, e.g., Henry Smith, supra note 8, at 24 (“[F]iduciary law is mostly but not entirely
contractarian.”).
145. Frankel, supra note 4, at 810.
146. Alexander, supra note 3, at 776.
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giving as an example the business judgment rule.147
Traditionalists make economic arguments of their own. Gold argues
that tying fiduciary obligation more closely to moral intuitions could increase
efficiency and compliance.148 Gold also argues that the much larger number
of parties potentially involved in the business organization context make
tying fiduciary obligations to moral intuitions more important because of
coordination problems.149 Variation or limits on fiduciary obligations may
create negative externalities that are borne by all trusts,150 thus restrictions
on modification or waiver of fiduciary duties may be justified as necessary
to limit negative externalities.151
That traditionalists feel compelled to make economic arguments of their
own and to recognize the role of contract shows that the traditionalist view
has incomplete explanatory power. The economic explanation of fiduciary
law is more satisfactory than a philosophical explanation, especially
regarding modern fiduciary law. The traditionalist approach is poorly suited
for explaining fiduciaries in business organizations. It does not give a
satisfactory explanation for why sophisticated parties dealing at arms-length
should be restricted from modifying their fiduciary obligations to each other.
And it fails to recognize the enormous role that statute plays in fiduciary law
today and what that means.
B. Limits of Contractarian Arguments
Opposite the traditionalists stand the contractarians. The contractarians
look more to the modern iterations of fiduciary obligation. They tend to view
fiduciary obligation in terms of statutory law and contract. They think of
and talk about fiduciary obligation in economic terms and reject any moral
component to fiduciary obligation.152 They tend to treat fiduciary obligation
147. Henry Smith, supra note 8, at 274.
148. Andrew S. Gold, The New Concept of Loyalty in Corp. L., 43 U.C. DAVIS L. REV.
457, 503 (2009) (citing Seana Valentine Shiffrin, The Divergence of Contract and Promise,
120 HARV. L. REV. 708, 713–19 (2007); Melvin A. Eisenberg, Corp. L. and Social Norms, 99
COLUM. L. REV. 1253, 1272–73 (1999); John C.P. Goldberg & Benjamin C. Zipursky, The
Moral of MacPherson, 146 U. PA. L. REV. 1733, 1840–41 (1998); Paul Robinson & John
Darley, The Utility of Desert, 91 NW. U. L. REV. 453 (1997)).
149. Id. at 508.
150. Leslie, supra note 122, at 89.
151. Id. (citing Thomas W. Merrill & Henry E. Smith, Optimal Standardization in the L.
of Property: The Numerus Clausus Principle, 110 YALE L.J. 1, 25–34 (2000); Thomas W.
Merrill & Henry E. Smith, The Property/Contract Interface, 101 COLUM. L. REV. 773 (2001);
Jeffrey N. Gordon, The Mandatory Structure of Corp. L., 89 COLUM. L. REV. 1549, 1568–70
(1989)).
152. Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 2, at 427 (“Fiduciary duties . . . have no moral
footing.”).
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as a subset of business organization law and to talk about it in that context.
They are amenable to and proponents of limiting fiduciary obligation by
contract. And the literature tends to have its academic foundations in
economics.153
Economic, not moral, basis. Easterbrook and Fischel argue fiduciary
duties are not special and have no moral footing but rather that “they are the
same sorts of obligations, derived and enforced in the same way, as other
contractual undertakings.”154 Easterbrook and Fischel see fiduciary
relationships as contractual relationships with particularly high transaction
costs.155 Under this view, fiduciary law should be based on a cost-benefit
analysis, looking in the aggregate and from an ex ante perspective.156 Under
economic rather than moral reasoning, some conflicts should not be
prohibited because compliance costs of prohibition make prohibition too
costly or because the conflicts are in fact benign.157 Contractarians see
evidence of economic reasoning in the development of modern fiduciary
law.158
The contractarians argue that the morally inflected language so often
found in fiduciary obligation cases is not only dicta but ignored and
irrelevant.159 The contractarians are critical of morally inflected language in
court opinions dealing with fiduciary obligations. Simply put, contractarians
accuse courts of failing to practice what they preach, instead analyzing
fiduciary relationships just as they analyze nonfiduciary contractual
relationships.160 Contractarians also criticize the morally inflected rhetoric
of judges and the traditionalists on other grounds. Two examples include,
because it “encourages beneficiaries to over trust,”161 and because offers of
153. The seminal works on the economics of fiduciary obligation are by Robert Cooter
and Bradley J. Freedman and by Frank H. Easterbrook and Daniel R. Fischel. Robert Cooter
& Bradley J. Freedman, The Fiduciary Relationship: Its Economic Character and Legal
Consequences, 66 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1045 (1991); Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 2.
154. Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 2, at 427.
155. Id.
156. See, e.g., Langbein, supra note 9, at 937 (arguing consumer protection authorities do
not follow the sole interest rule used in trust law for just that reason).
157. Id. at 938.
158. See, e.g., Id. at 939–43 (arguing that adoption of rules allowing reasonable trustee
compensation, moving away from court supervised estate administration, and allowing
conflicted persons to be appointed as health care surrogates empowered to terminate a
person’s life support all reflect cost-benefit judgments).
159. See, e.g., Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 2, at 429 (“[W]e seek knowledge of
when fiduciary duties arise and what form they take, not a theory of rhetoric—a theory of
what judges do, not of explanations they give.”). See also Williams, supra note 100, at 373
(“[S]uch flowery descriptions of affirmative devotion are not the basis of liability.”) (citation
omitted).
160. Alexander, supra note 3, at 767.
161. Williams, supra note 100, at 370.
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devotion by fiduciaries are not enforceable.162
Information asymmetries. Entrustors tend to rely on the discretion of
the fiduciary.163 Discretion is important in the literature. Ribstein argues that
fiduciary obligation arises from the delegation of managerial discretion —
without corresponding economic rights — by a property owner to a
manager.164 Gordon Smith uses a similar formulation, arguing that fiduciary
obligation arises from one party giving another discretion and control over a
That discretion, though, creates information
“critical resource.”165
asymmetry between the fiduciary and the entrustor. Relying on the
fiduciary’s discretion, expertise, or likely both, the entrustor is not positioned
to effectively monitor the fiduciary,166 providing an economic justification
for fiduciary obligation. That information asymmetry can only partly be
mitigated by retention of counsel.167
Market constraints. Contractarians see market constraints as
lessening the need for strict fiduciary obligations. Those constraints
disincentivize corporations from deviating from standard terms if those
deviations would reduce the corporation’s share price.168 Shareholders in
publicly traded corporations have a powerful tool for market discipline —
easy exit.169 And, market constraints are not limited to post-formation
market pressures. Contractarians put great weight on the fact that the
fiduciary and entrustor typically enter into their relationship voluntarily and
for gain through a contract or at least a contract-like process.170 That is, of
course, a form of market restraint.

162. See id. at 372 (“While fiduciaries may advertise their extreme care, dedication,
expertise, and superior judgment and a beneficiary may rely on the expectation that the
fiduciary will be devoted to her cause when entering the relationship, devotion is not an
enforceable term.”).
163. Williams, supra note 100, at 357 (The entrustor “relies heavily on the fiduciary’s
discretion.”).
164. Larry E. Ribstein, Fencing Fiduciary Duties, 91 B.U. L. REV. 899, 901 (2011).
165. D. Gordon Smith, The Critical Resource Theory of Fiduciary Duty, 55 VAND. L.
REV. 1399, 1402 (2002).
166. See Williams, supra note 100, at 357 (“The beneficiary is generally unable to monitor
the fiduciary closely because she lacks the time and/or expertise to do so.”) (citing Larry E.
Ribstein, Are Partners Fiduciaries?, 2005 U. ILL. L. REV. 209, 216 (2005)).
167. See Sandra K. Miller, What Fiduciary Duties Should Apply to the LLC Manager
After more than a Decade of Experimentation?, 32 J. CORP. L. 565, 583–86 (2007) (using
survey results to argue that majority investors are more often represented by counsel than
minority investors, that LLC agreements are often not extensively negotiated, and that many
attorneys have only a limited familiarity with the relevant statutory provisions).
168. Leslie, supra note 122, at 92–93.
169. Manuel Utset, Towards a Bargaining Theory of the Firm, 80 CORNELL L. REV. 540,
571 (1995) (“[N]o agreement may be forced on either party, given that each party can choose
to exit the corporation.”).
170. Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 2, at 426.
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Agency costs. Fiduciary law is becoming more popular with regulators
One approach is
attempting to mitigate the agency problem.171
disempowerment. Disempowering approaches include disallowing a trustee
from engaging in market transactions over the trust property, terminating an
agent’s authority on the incapacity of the principal, and disabling a
corporation from undertaking any activity beyond the limited purpose laid
out in the corporate charter under the ultra vires doctrine.172 We have already
discussed one type of agency cost in the fiduciary obligation context —
monitoring. According to Sitkoff, fiduciary law is a deterrence system that
mitigates agency costs by providing a vehicle for courts to complete a
contract after the fact; accordingly, “[f]iduciary duties yield to the contrary
agreement of the parties.”173 The duties of loyalty and care are couched in
open-ended, expansive terms because of the agency costs due to incomplete
contracting.174
Gap-filling measure. Contractarians treat fiduciary duties as gapfillers. Sitkoff describes fiduciary obligations as principles courts use to
judge a fiduciary’s actions against “what the parties would have agreed if
they had been able to anticipate those facts and circumstances.”175 That is,
fiduciary duties function as implicit contract terms that only apply where
there is no explicit contractual provision. Contractarians view this as
necessary because it is impossible for parties to write contracts that cover the
universe of their intended obligations.176 Fiduciary duties are presumptive
contract terms that promote the parties’ welfare where express provisions are
absent.177 This stands in stark contrast to the view that a fiduciary duty is a
“pre-existing moral or ethical obligation.”178
The traditionalists sometimes use gap-filling language as well.179 For
example, Leslie defines contractual fiduciary duties as a gap-filling measure
that attempts to predict not just “the terms that the parties would have agreed
to ex ante,” but the terms they would have agreed to ex ante if bargaining

171. Robert H. Sitkoff, The Economic Structure of Fiduciary Law, 91 B.U. L. REV. 1039,
1042 (2011) (citations omitted).
172. See id. (describing disempowerment as a failed strategy for addressing agency
problems).
173. Id. at 1045.
174. Id. at 1044.
175. Id. (emphasis added).
176. Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 2, at 426 (citations omitted).
177. Id. at 431. Easterbrook and Fischel go so far as to label this as “all but inevitable”
and any alternatives as “self-defeating.”
178. Leslie, supra note 122, at 73.
179. See, e.g., Frankel, supra note 4, at 825 (“The courts can provide protection to the
entrustor by imposing . . . the fiduciary obligations the parties would have agreed upon if the
cost of contracting or the nature of the relation had not precluded them from doing so.”).
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was costless and they anticipated the future conflict.180 But, of course,
bargaining is not costless.
If fiduciary obligations are gap fillers addressing transaction costs that
lead to the problem of incomplete contract, then they are no longer necessary
when the agreement covers the presumed gaps. The same logic applies
where a statute fills the gaps.
Limits of the contractarian arguments. But fiduciary law in the
business organization context cannot be viewed as entirely contractual.
While initial corporate charters can be viewed as contracts, charter
amendments cannot.181 This would include charter amendments that modify
fiduciary duties. Heminway questions whether LLC operating agreements
can be properly characterized as contracts.182 And even committed
contractarians see a limit. Sitkoff, for example, puts it in economic terms:
“[T]he mandatory core insulates fiduciary obligations that the law assumes
would not be bargained away by a fully informed, sophisticated principal.”183
That view, though, invites judges and commentators to simply label any
party that does bargain away core fiduciary duties as either ill-informed or
unsophisticated.
The contractarian view is unsatisfying in that it fails to account for the
historical and continuing role of equity in the development of fiduciary law.
It is overly focused on contract at the expense of statute. And, most of all,
the contractarian view does not give proper credence to the morally inflected
language judges use when writing about fiduciaries. To properly appreciate
the importance of that language we need to consider cognition.
IV.

COGNITION AND FIDUCIARY OBLIGATIONS

Moving beyond the limited traditionalist and contractarian
explanations, one way in which fiduciary law can be better understood is by
considering issues of cognition, especially the “schema.” Judges are human
and subject to the same cognitive processes and limitations as any other
human decision-maker. Accordingly, we can learn more about the
development of the law by exploring human cognition.184 Schemas are one
180. Leslie, supra note 122, at 79 (citing Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, THE
ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF CORPORATE LAW 92 (1991)).
181. Lucian Bebchuk, The Debate on Contractual Freedom in Corporate Law, 89
COLUM. L. REV. 1395, 1400 (1989).
182. Joan Heminway, The Ties That Bind: LLC Operating Agreements as Binding
Commitments, 68 SMU L. REV. 811, 812 (2015) (“[A]n operating agreement may not
constitute a contract at common law, and state LLC laws do not expressly label an operating
agreement a statutory contract.”).
183. Sitkoff, supra note 171, at 1047.
184. Rachlinski, supra note 25, at 62.
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of those relevant cognitive processes. Schema “describe our expectations
about, for example, people, entities, or social groups” and “represent
knowledge about a concept . . . includ[ing] the concept’s attributes and the
relations among them.”185 In layman’s terms, it is a preconceived notion.
I argue that a single schema is most typically associated with fiduciary
obligation. That schema is in keeping with the traditional roots of fiduciary
obligation. It is associated with hierarchical relationships. Fiduciary
obligation was first concerned with relationships such as the trusteebeneficiary relationship, where the trustee was in a position of power relative
to the beneficiary. I have identified three hallmarks of judicial decisionmaking driven by a schema for fiduciaries — morally inflected language,
equitable reasoning, and reasoning by analogy. I will give examples of each
showing up in cases where the judge made an error related to fiduciary
obligation. We look first to the language used by judges in talking about
fiduciary obligation.
Morally inflected language. Contractarians argue that judges’ use of
morally inflected language in cases such as Meinhard v. Salman does not
square with the realities of fiduciary obligation. Why, then, has similar
language so often appeared in cases discussing fiduciary obligation? There
are innumerable examples. I will give a couple of the most famous examples
before discussing a case in which morally inflected language appears
alongside judicial error.
The Supreme Court of the United States spoke forcefully on the subject
in 1939 in Pepper v. Litton.186 The Court starts by referencing “rules of fair
play and good conscience” before going on to reference “the standards of
common decency and honesty.”187 In between, the Court expressly states
that a fiduciary cannot serve two masters — they must put the needs of the
entrustor before their own.188 That which is “permitted outsiders in a race of
creditors” acting at arms-length is barred to the fiduciary.189 More
specifically, the Court states that a corporate fiduciary cannot use inside
information and their position for their own gain and cannot do “indirectly
through the corporation what [they] could not do directly.”190 These
limitations held, in the Court’s eyes, “no matter how absolute in terms” the
power of the fiduciary and “no matter how meticulous” the fiduciary is in

185. Susan T. Fiske & Shelley E. Taylor, SOCIAL COGNITION: FROM BRAINS TO CULTURE
104 (2d ed. 2013).
186. Pepper v. Litton, 308 U.S. 295, 310–11 (1939).
187. Id.
188. Id. at 311.
189. Id.
190. Id.
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satisfying formal requirements.191 And that limit was equitable.192 The Court
returned to equity in laying out the consequence: “Where there is a violation
of those principles, equity will undo the wrong or intervene to prevent its
consummation.”193
The Supreme Court of Delaware used similar language in Guth v. Loft,
Inc., also issued in 1939.194 The Court begins by stating flat out that
“[c]orporate officers and directors are not permitted to use their position of
trust and confidence to further their private interests.”195 The Court does note
that corporate officers and directors are not trustees.196 Much like Judge
Cardozo in Meinhard v. Salman, the Court in Guth relies heavily on morally
inflected language. The public policy in question has “exist[ed] through the
years” and is “derived from a profound knowledge of human characteristics
and motives.”197 The result was “a rule that demands . . . peremptorily and
inexorably, the most scrupulous observance” of a corporate officer’s or
director’s fiduciary duty and that is “inveterate and uncompromising in its
rigidity.”198 Corporate officers and directors have both an affirmative duty
to protect corporate interests and a duty to refrain from injuring the
corporation or depriving it of profit.199 The loyalty to the corporation must
be “undivided and unselfish.”200 Failure to meet that standard is a
“betrayal.”201
The Court also makes nods toward equity. Per the Court, it cannot
formulate a “hard and fast rule” because fiduciary obligations arise in “many
and varied” contexts.202 Accordingly, there is “no fixed scale” for the loyalty
standard.203 The Court characterized the rule as based on a broad “foundation
of a wise public policy” rather than “the narrow ground of injury . . . to the
corporation.”204 That broad approach, though, brought an ease of
administrability: where there was breach of fiduciary duty, “a certain result

191. Id.
192. Id. (“For that power is at all times subject to the equitable limitation that it may not
be exercised for the aggrandizement, preference, or advantage of the fiduciary to the exclusion
or detriment of the” entrustor.) (emphasis added).
193. Id.
194. Guth v. Loft, Inc., 5 A.2d 503, 510 (Del. 1939), superseded by statute.
195. Id.
196. Id.
197. Id. (emphasis added).
198. Id. (emphasis added).
199. Id.
200. Id.
201. Id.
202. Id.
203. Id.
204. Id.
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follows.”205
Let us turn to a more recent case to see the appearance of morally
inflected language, in particular, alongside judicial error. The Estate of
Rothko trial court opinion206 is open to criticism for the failure to account for
the estate’s need to generate cash to pay estate taxes and cash bequests.207
But it is also striking for its morally inflected language. An executor has a
“selfish interest.”208 “Rigid adherence” is necessary to remove “all
temptation.”209 “Divided loyalties” must be “obliterate[d]” and their effects
“utterly. . .destroy[ed].”210
The actions of the fiduciaries were
211
“disheartening.”
This sort of language survives in contemporary judicial opinions and in
the business organization context.212 It shows up even where the applicable
statute broadly allows for waiver of fiduciary duties and the relevant contract
does just that.213 And it leads to judges making errors in deciding fiduciary
obligation cases.
Equitable reasoning. In Pappas v. Tzolis, the court ultimately
enforced the fiduciary duty waiver at issue, but it did not do so on the basis
of the New York LLC statute.214 The parties had formed an LLC to hold the
lease on a building in Manhattan, and their operating agreement allowed the
three members of the LLC to “engage in business ventures and investments
of any nature whatsoever, whether or not in competition with the LLC.”215
This is a common approach to waiver in the business organization context
because it is often advantageous to recruit an investor with existing interests
in the same line of business. The LLC was ill-fated and, after numerous
205. Id.
206. Estate of Rothko, 84 Misc. 2d 830 (N.Y. Surr. Ct. 1975).
207. See, e.g., Alexander, supra note 3, at 778–82 (discussing criticisms of the decisions
by each court).
208. Rothko, 84 Misc. 2d at 847.
209. Id.
210. Id. at 848.
211. Id. at 849.
212. See, e.g., AB Group v. Wertin, 69 Cal. Rptr. 2d 652, 656 (Ct. App. 1997) (“Equity
can hardly tolerate—much less impose as a duty—the deliberate attempt to deprive a
contracting party of the fruits of his or her bargain . . . . [I]n the equitable matter of partnership
fiduciary duties . . . ).
213. See, e.g., BT-I v. Equitable Life Assurance Soc’y of the U.S., 89 Cal. Rptr. 2d 811,
817–18 (Ct. App. 1999) (“But the fact that the act allows the parties to structure many aspects
of their relationship is not a license to freely engage in self-dealing—it remains our
responsibility to delimit the outer boundaries of permissible conduct by a fiduciary. In view
of the rule against waiving fundamental fiduciary duties, we cannot stretch these general
provisions to include giving Equitable a free hand to act for its own self-interest. Equitable
was still a fiduciary, and its conduct must be measured by fiduciary standards.”).
214. Pappas v. Tzolis, 982 N.E.2d 576 (N.Y. 2012).
215. Id. at 578.
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disputes, Tzolis bought out the interests of the other two members.216 The
accompanying agreement provided that “Tzolis has no fiduciary duty to the
undersigned Sellers in connection with [the] assignments.”217 Just seven
months later Tzolis was able to assign the lease for over ten times as much
as he paid the other members.218
The LLC in question was governed by the New York LLC Act. But the
court did not interpret the NY LLC Act. Instead, the court relied on a judgemade — and equitable — rule that waivers are only enforceable if the
releaser is sophisticated and the relationship is no longer one of
unquestioning trust.219 The court was correct in enforcing the release, but it
did so for the wrong reason.
Reasoning by analogy. Judges also err in reasoning by analogy rather
than interpreting the applicable statutory provision. For example, in USAT
Reorganization LLC v. Writer, the managers of an LLC had signed a release
after an earlier dispute.220 Rather than look to the California LLC Act, the
court relied on partnership precedent, despite the very different language
used in the two statutes.221
The most famous statement on fiduciary obligation is from Meinhard v.
Salmon.222 All three hallmarks of schema-driven judicial decision-making
are present. In Meinhard, then-Judge Cardozo declared that “[a] trustee is
held to something stricter than the morals of the market place.”223 Honesty
alone was not enough, but rather “the punctilio of an honor the most
sensitive” is require.224 Thus, “the level of conduct for fiduciaries [has] been
kept at a level higher than that trodden by the crowd.”225 That was based on
the “[u]ncompromising rigidity” that “has been the attitude of courts of
equity.”226 We see morally inflected language. We see references to courts
of equity. And Judge Cardozo analogizes partners and partnerships to

216. Id.
217. Id.
218. Id.
219. Id. at 579 (quoting Centro Empresarial Cempresa S.A. v. America Movil, S.A.B. de
C.V., 952 N.E.2d 995, 1001 (N.Y. 2011)). See also Pace, supra note 39 at 1110–11
(criticizing the court for applying an equitable rule rather than interpreting the relevant
statute).
220. USAT Reorganization LLC v. Writer, No. D043230, 2004 WL 2538848, at *2, *16
(Nov. 10, 2004) (unpublished).
221. Id. at 16–17. See also Pace, supra note 39 at 1111–12 (criticizing the court for
applying California partnership precedents rather than interpreting the distinct language of the
California LLC act).
222. Meinhard v. Salmon, 164 N.E. 545 (1928).
223. Id. at 546.
224. Id.
225. Id.
226. Id.
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trustees and trusts.
Scholarly response. Traditionalists argue that this language matters.
DeMott argues that judges’ use of a “moral obligation” rationale in fiduciary
obligation cases shows that judges are employing high social values rather
than simply attempting to fill a gap in the parties’ agreement.227 Judicial
opinions communicate information to business-people, attorneys, and other
judges.228 Regarding moral behavior itself, Frankel argues that selfenforcing altruistic behavior is considered more moral because moral
behavior is considered altruistic and voluntary.229 Fiduciaries may not be
inherently moral, but fiduciary law places fiduciaries “in the role of a moral
person” and then pressures them to act selflessly.230
Others argue that the language is harmful or irrelevant. Williams, for
example, argues that “[m]oralistic rhetoric” gives a false impression that the
resulting high expectations are enforceable.231 Other contractarians argue
that this language does not matter, both because express contractual
provisions prevail over implicit provisions and because, while “moralizing
is cost free to judges,” 232 morally inflected language does not “establish[ ]
that ethics rather than economics best explains the legal rules.”233 But the
psychology literature suggests otherwise, and too many decisions are
otherwise unexplainable. And while economics may continue to better
explain fiduciary law than ethics, that explanation is stronger if informed by
behavioral economics and psychology.
The application of schemas to fiduciaries. Schemas are one of the
many shortcuts that the brain uses to perform well despite its natural
constraints.234 One source for the development of schemas is concrete
experiences.235 This is troubling in the context of claims for breach of
fiduciary duty. The primary concrete experiences with fiduciary obligation
of a judge tasked with presiding over a claim for breach of fiduciary duty are
the cases over which the judge has previously presided. This is troubling
227. DeMott, supra note 98, at 891–92.
228. Cf. Gold, supra note 148, at 505 (“One can view laws as communicating information
to an audience.”) (citing Henry E. Smith, The Language of Property: Form, Context, and
Audience, 55 STAN. L. REV. 1105, 1108 (2003)).
229. Frankel, supra note 4, at 830.
230. Id. at 830.
231. Williams, supra note 100, at 369–70. See also Langbein, supra note 9, at 938 (“The
very term ‘conflict’ is an epithet that prejudices our understanding.”).
232. Easterbrook and Fischel, supra note 2, at 428.
233. Id. at 428 n.6.
234. Accord Rachlinski, supra note 25, at 61 (citing Daniel Kahneman & Amos Tversky,
On the Reality of Cognitive Illusions, 103 PSYCHOL. REV. 582, 582 (1996); Daniel Kahneman
& Amos Tversky, Judgment Under Uncertainty: Heuristics and Biases, 185 SCI. 1124, 1124
(1974)).
235. Alexander, supra note 3, at 770.
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because judges only see failed relationships in their courtrooms.236
Evaluating a claim for breach of fiduciary duty requires a causal explanation.
In seeking that explanation, social observers are quick to “go beyond
constructing causal explanations and attribute blame to individuals.”237 A
fiduciary owing explicit duties is an especially attractive scapegoat.238
Fiduciaries play their own role in developing a schema. For example,
when trust administration largely shifted to large financial institutions, trust
companies consciously sought to build a reputation for trustworthiness
through marketing.239 But reliance on schemas is not without a cost. Like
other mental shortcuts, relying on schemas leaves judges susceptible to
errors of judgment.240
Non-expert observers are quicker to blame “dominant role-occupants in
hierarchal relationships” — such as the traditional fiduciary — than they are
to blame either party to “nonhierarchical relationships.”241 Judges are no
different, as they learn to view fiduciaries as subject to stricter legal norms
than nonfiduciaries.242 That explains one of the reasons fiduciaries will seek
waivers of their duties ex ante — because “[b]laming the dominant roleoccupant is the default norm for hierarchical relationships.”243 But while
fiduciaries in the business organization context may superficially resemble a
dominant role-occupant in a vertical relationship, they are often better
characterized as parties to horizontal, non-hierarchical relationships. Thus
false positive findings of culpability and liability by fiduciaries can be
expected. Parties will seek to contract around recourse to the courts when
they lack faith that the courts will come to the proper conclusion in deciding
a dispute.
Schemas provide an explanatory factor as to why courts at least some
of the time treat modern fiduciaries differently than traditional fiduciaries.
Per Alexander, people use schemas to categorize a role as hierarchical or
nonhierarchical.244 The examples Alexander gives highlight the difference.
Hierarchically structured relationships include “doctor-patient, lawyerclient, and parent-child relationships,” while nonhierarchically structured
236. See, e.g., Pace, supra note 39, at 1089 (noting that although contracts are performed
successfully 95 percent of the time, judges only see agreements that have failed in some way).
237. Alexander, supra note 3, at 772 (citing Fiske & Taylor, supra note 83–86).
238. Id.
239. Id. at 775.
240. Accord Rachlinski, supra note 25, at 61 (citing Daniel Kahneman & Amos Tversky,
On the Reality of Cognitive Illusions, 103 PSYCHOL. REV. 582, 582 (1996); Daniel Kahneman
& Amos Tversky, Judgment Under Uncertainty: Heuristics and Biases, 185 SCI. 1124, 1124
(1974))
241. Alexander, supra note 3, at 774.
242. Id.
243. Id.
244. Id.
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relationships include “friends, business partners, and co-workers.”245 This
provides a partial explanation both as to why courts have proven more open
to limitations on and waivers of fiduciary duties in the business organization
context and to why they sometimes have proven reticent to enforce such
waivers.246 Schemas, then, can both reinforce and muddle the divide within
the law.
Top-down versus bottom-up analysis. The psychology literature
differentiates between top-down and bottom-up modes of cognitive
analysis.247 Top-down modes of cognitive analysis are “heavily influenced
by one’s organized prior knowledge.”248 That is, a heavy influence is exerted
by the “preconceived notions and expectations” of the analyst.249 But where
top-down modes of analysis are “theory-driven or image-driven,” bottom-up
modes are “data-driven.”250 As such, they are not as influenced by
preconceived expectations as top-down processes.251 Alexander further
ascribes the tendency by judges to apply top-down modes of analysis to
schemas.252 Schemas also — as an “information gap-filler”253 — fill a
psychological role similar to that filled by fiduciary obligation in the law.
Alexander argues that courts do not have a well-developed schema for
contracting parties, unlike fiduciaries.254 This is likely because contractual
relationships are incredibly flexible and customizable; they can be extended
to cover an almost infinite array of relationships. Courts are right not to
shove such a broad-based tool into such a narrow box. Bottom-up processes
are particularly superior to top-down processes in statutory and contractual
interpretation.
Alexander argues that courts evaluate trustees, executors, and estate
administrators (i.e., property fiduciaries) differently than parties to
contractual relationships due to cognitive factors.255 Accepting that judges
analyze traditional fiduciary relationships in such a way, the question is how
judges analyze fiduciary relationships in more modern contexts, particularly
in the business organization context. The highly statutory and contractual
nature of those relationships and obligations counsels for evaluating them
245. Id. (emphasis added).
246. See, e.g., Pace, supra note 39, at 1095–109 (detailing case law upholding waivers of
fiduciary duties in the LLC context).
247. Alexander, supra note 3, at 768.
248. Fiske & Taylor, supra note 185, at 104.
249. Alexander, supra note 3, at 768 (citing SUSAN T. FISKE & SHELLEY E. TAYLOR,
SOCIAL COGNITION 104 (2d ed. 2013).
250. Id.
251. Id.
252. Id.
253. Id. at 771.
254. Id. at 769.
255. Id. at 768.
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more like contractual relationships, but the language from cases like Pepper
v. Litton, Guth v. Loft, Inc., and Meinhard v. Salmon shows judges talking
about them much like they would a traditional, equitable fiduciary
relationship. This is in keeping with Alexander’s application of cognitive
theory, or behavioral decision theory, to fiduciary law.256
Cognitive biases. Judicial error stemming from applying schemas
associated with traditional fiduciary relationships to modern fiduciary
relationships is compounded by the close association of schemas with
cognitive biases. Schemas are especially closely associated with the
conservatism bias and thus highly resistant to cognitive change.257 The
conservatism bias is defined as the tendency to underestimate and undervalue
the importance of new evidence.258 Schemas have an anchoring effect that
exacerbates the conservatism bias.259 Commentators have noted that
cognitive biases afflict parties to agreements curtailing fiduciary duties260
and judges deciding breach of fiduciary duty cases.261
Schemas also operate in conjunction with cognitive phenomena such as
hindsight bias.262 Alexander defines hindsight bias as “individuals’ tendency
to consistently exaggerate what, in foresight, they could have anticipated”;
that is, people persistently believe that they could and should have known ex
ante what they know ex post.263 To put it another way, after the fact, people
greatly overrate the ease with which an event could have been anticipated.264
Combatting hindsight bias is difficult because it is unnatural to ignore a
known outcome.265
Hindsight bias is particularly dangerous for fiduciaries. To weigh a
fiduciary’s conduct, judges must often engage in the unnatural act of
assessing “the predictability of past outcomes.”266 Rachlinksi has argued that
256. Id. (citing Robert A. Hillman, The Limits of Behavioral Decision Theory in Legal
Analysis: The Case of Liquidated Damages, 85 CORNELL L. REV. 717 (2000); Jeffrey J.
Rachlinski, The “New” Law and Psychology: A Reply to Critics, Skeptics, and Cautious
Supporters, 85 CORNELL L. REV. 739 (2000)).
257. Id. at 772 (citing Ward Edwards, Conservatism in Human Information Processing,
Judgement Under Uncertainty: Heuristics and Biases 359 (1982) (“An abundance of research
has shown that human beings are conservative processors of fallible information.”)).
258. Kahneman & Tversky, Judgment Under Uncertainty: Heuristics and Biases, 185
SCI. at 1125.
259. Alexander, supra note 3, at 772 (citing Amos Tversky & Daniel Kahneman,
Judgment Under Uncertainty: Heuristics and Biases, 185 SCI. at 1128).
260. Melvin Aron Eisenberg, The Limits of Cognition and the Limits of Contract, 47
STAN. L. REV. 211, 249–51 (1995).
261. Pace, supra note 39, at 1089.
262. Alexander, supra note 3, at 782.
263. Id.
264. Rachlinski, supra note 25, at 67.
265. Id. at 69.
266. Id. (“Few decisions in ordinary life require an assessment of the predictability of past
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hindsight bias pervades judicial decisions on improper investment of trust
assets by trustees.267 The fiduciary schema reinforces hindsight bias.268 No
better example of hindsight bias in pernicious effect can be given than a court
holding that a trustee’s sale of stock from a diversified portfolio violated the
trustee’s fiduciary duties because he sold the stock “at the bottom of the
market.”269 Bedrock principles of finance fell to hindsight bias.270 There is
no easy fix. Rachlinski argues that any effort to address hindsight bias by
courts must recognize “there is no effective strategy to induce a judge . . . to
make an unbiased ex post assessment of the ex ante probability of an adverse
outcome.”271
Legislatures have acted more than judges to address hindsight bias, both
in general and in ways that specifically apply to fiduciaries. The burden of
production and the standard of proof typically place a greater encumbrance
on the plaintiff, the party most likely to benefit from hindsight bias.272
Rachlinski frames the business judgment rule as in part a reaction to the
deleterious effect of hindsight bias on determinations of liability.273 He also
sees bright-line rules as a sensible attempt at mitigating harm from hindsight
bias.274 In the context of trustee investments of trust assets, Rachlinski sees
both the occasional application of what amounts to a strict liability standard
and standards focused on “whether the trustee was adequately informed
before investing” as such attempts.275
Hindsight bias has proven especially prevalent in regards to trustee
investments of trust assets. Even after the advent of the prudent investor
rule, judges “repeatedly condemned trustees for purchasing ‘speculative’
investments such as shares of stock bought on margin, ‘bonds selling at a
large discount because of uncertainty as to whether they will be paid at
maturity,’ junior mortgages, and real estate,” even where held in well

outcomes, but such assessments are pervasive in legal contexts.”). See also 3 AUSTIN
WAKEMAN SCOTT & WILLIAM FRANKLIN FRATCHER, THE LAW OF TRUSTS 227, at 433 (4th ed.
1988) (“It is difficult for a judge . . . to disregard the lesson taught by subsequent events and
to put himself in the position in which the trustee was when he acted.”)
267. Id. at 73.
268. See Alexander, supra note 3, at 783 (arguing it does so in trust litigation).
269. First Alabama Bank v. Martin, 425 So. 2d 415, 428 (Ala. 1982).
270. But see Bevis Longstreth, Modern Investment Mgt. and the Prudent Man Rule 18
(1986) (characterizing Martin as an exceptional case of judicial “backwardness and
irrationality”).
271. Rachlinski, supra note 25, at 70 (emphasis added).
272. Id. at 71.
273. Id. at 72–73.
274. Id. at 78 (citing Jeffrey J. Rachlinski, Regulating in Foresight versus Judging
Liability in Hindsight: The Case of Tobacco, 33 GA. L. REV. 813, 830–31 (1999)).
275. Id.
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diversified portfolios.276 Judges have shown both financial illiteracy and
hindsight bias. The Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts ruled against
a trustee for investments making up just a small fraction of a diverse portfolio
due to “disquieting information” in the relevant disclosures.277 The Alabama
Supreme Court did them one better, taking a trustee to task for selling “at the
bottom of the market.”278
It should come as no surprise, then, that judicial thinking has not kept
up with the evolution of fiduciary law. The cognitive ability of
policymakers, though, has been a grossly understudied topic in the existing
literature.279 This Article begins to address that imbalance, but considerably
more attention is warranted, including empirical work utilizing both surveys
and experimental methods.
V.

OPTIMIZING MODERN STATUTORY AND CONTRACTUAL
FIDUCIARY OBLIGATION

This divide in fiduciary law and the reasons for it have been
underappreciated and have important implications for how we approach
fiduciary law. Statute has largely come to supplant equity as the definer of
fiduciary relationships and obligations. With this has come a greatly
increased role for legislatures and a decreased role for judges. Business
organizations, and especially alternative business entities, are particularly
well suited for modern, statutory and contractual fiduciary obligation.
Beyond the business organization context, the modern, statutory and
contractual form of fiduciary obligation is better suited to meeting the needs
of parties in a large array of new types of fiduciary relationships, because
legislatures are better positioned to address those needs and because statutory
and contractual definition allows for the flexibility to fit fiduciary obligation
to such diverse relationships. Bolting on fiduciary obligation statutorily and
customizing it as needed is a rational response to a basic design problem.
And while moral considerations should not be discounted, it may that they,
too, counsel in favor of this approach.

276. See id. at 76 (citing 3 AUSTIN WAKEMAN SCOTT & WILLIAM FRANKLIN FRATCHER,
THE LAW OF TRUSTS 227.6, at 444; RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS 227 cmt. F (1959);
First Ala. Bank v. Martin, 425 So. 2d 415 (Ala. 1982); Estate of McCredy, 470 A.2d 585 (Pa.
Super. 1983); Steiner v. Hawaiian Trust Co., 393 P.2d 96 (Haw. 1964)).
277. Chase v. Pevear, 419 N.E.2d 1358, 1368 (Mass. 1981).
278. First Ala. Bank v. Martin, 425 So. 2d 415, 428 (Ala. 1982).
279. Niclas Berggren, Time for Behavioral Political Economy? An Analysis of Articles in
Behavioral Economics (finding that 95.5% of studied articles in behavioral economics fail to
analyze the cognitive ability of policymakers), available at http://papers.ssrn.co
m/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1846184 [https://perma.cc/YG8M-CQZQ].
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As we’ve seen, fiduciary law’s roots are equitable.280 It arose out of
certain sorts of relationships. It was focused on the status of the fiduciary.
It was focused on a relationship between the fiduciary and entrustor where
the fiduciary was in a position of trust and given discretion by an entrustor
not in a position to effectively monitor the fiduciary.
That can certainly be the case in the modern business organization
context. But it is frequently not. And whether it is or is not is not relevant
— fiduciary duties are owed nonetheless. The court will not look to whether
the entrustor trusted the fiduciary, or whether the fiduciary was given
discretion, or whether the entrustor was in a position to effectively monitor
the fiduciary; the court will only look to whether the relevant statute provides
that the first party was in a role such that they owed fiduciary duties to the
second party. And then the court will look to any relevant contract.
Statutory rules regarding how fiduciary relationships may be defined
are not at odds with the contractarian approach because they are “best
understood as implicit contractual terms.”281 But to term fiduciary law
contractarian is a bit of a misnomer because statutes, organizational
documents, and contracts can combine to delineate the contours of the
fiduciary relationship. Where the statute provides for it, organizational
documents and contracts serve as gap-fillers where the statute either does not
speak or devolves decision-making power.
Judges often apply the same schema for modern fiduciary obligations
with statutory or contractual roots as they do for traditional fiduciary
obligations. To put it another way, judges analogize the relationships of the
former with the relationships of the latter.282 But modern fiduciary
obligations are different in kind than traditional fiduciary obligations.283
Because the authority for the fiduciary obligation flows from a statutory or
contractual source, the schema described above no longer fits. Judges should
abandon the top-down approach to analyzing fiduciary obligations in favor
of a bottom-up analysis.284 What was once amenable to a single schema now
may come in as many flavors as legislatures and entrepreneurs can devise.
280. See supra Part II (discussing how equity has shaped fiduciary obligations).
281. Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 2, at 429 (citing Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel
R. Fischel, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF CORPORATE LAW (1991)).
282. Frankel, supra note 4, at 804.
283. Cf. Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 2, at 425 (“During the last two centuries,
courts have been adapting this duty of loyalty and its remedy to other agency relations, under
the title ‘fiduciary’ duty. That is adaption, not extension.”).
284. There is evidence that judges’ interpretative methods can and do change over time.
See, e.g., Abbe R. Gluck & Richard A. Posner, Statutory Interpretation on the Bench: A
Survey of Forty-Two Judges on the Federal Courts of Appeals, 131 HARV. L. REV. 1298, 1311
(2018) (identifying a divide between older judges—labeled “legal process institutionalists”—
who view statutory interpretation as a “quasi-legislative activity” and younger judges—
labeled “canonists”—who take a “more rule-oriented approach”).
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Attempting to shoehorn fiduciary duties from the trust or other traditional
contexts without looking to the relevant statute, contract, or both, will result
in unsatisfactory rules.285
There is a reflexive recoiling at the idea that fiduciary duties in, say, the
LLC context may be waived. That reflex is based on thinking about fiduciary
obligation in terms of its equitable roots. Part of getting away from that and
properly understanding the role of fiduciary duties in the business
organization context is a recognition that they are just a component that the
parties to a contractual relationship within certain statutorily prescribed
bounds take off or leave on the figurative shelf. They are just another piece
in how the parties choose to define their relationships, not any sort of moral
obligation.
The limitations of equity. Equity cannot fully explain fiduciary law
because it is limited. For example, at the time of the American Revolution,
the British Court of Chancery lacked “equitable jurisdiction to grant or
extend derivative standing” in the corporate context unless there was a
“threat to justice.”286 The LLC and other alternative business entities did not
exist in 1792.287 As creatures of statute, they did not even exist at common
law.288 Rules of equity have a place in Delaware LLC law, but only where
not abrogated by statute.289 Equity serves at the mercy of statute, not the
other way around.
Equity itself is a gap-filler.290 There is only a role for equity where
remedies have not been provided for at law.291 If the legislature has acted to
define the remedy, even if in doing so it has limited that remedy or provided
for private parties to limit that remedy by agreement, then there is no place
for equity.292 Because it provides for default fiduciary duties, allows for
contractual limitation on the modification of those duties, and even allows

285. Cf. Frankel, supra note 4, at 797 (arguing that developing fiduciary law by
analogizing to preexisting fiduciary relations often does not result in appropriate rules).
286. CML V, LLC v. Bax, 28 A.3d 1037, 1045 (Del. 2011).
287. Id.
288. Id. LLCs did not exist in the United States until 1977 (first in Wyoming) and in
Delaware until 1992.
289. Id. (“[I]f the General Assembly has defined a right, remedy, or obligation with
respect to an LLC, courts cannot interpret the common law to override the express provisions
the General Assembly adopted.”) (relying on 6 DEL. C. § 18-1104 (“In any case not provided
for in this chapter, the rules of law and equity . . . shall govern.”).
290. Cf. Prod. Res. Gp., LLC v. NCT Gp., Inc., 863 A.2d 772, 789–90 (Del. Ch. 2004)
(criticizing the equitable use of fiduciary duty to “fill gaps that do not exist”).
291. Cf. Chavin v. H.H. Rosin & Co., 246 A.2d 921, 922 (Del. 1968) (“It is, of course,
axiomatic that Equity has no jurisdiction over a controversy for which there is a complete and
adequate remedy at law.”).
292. See, e.g., CML V, LLC v. Bax, 28 A.3d 1037, 1046 (Del. 2011) (refusing to extend
equitable remedies to a party that “could have negotiated its remedies by contract”).
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those duties to be expanded, the Delaware LLC Act, for example, provides
ample means for LLC members to protect themselves at law.293
The case for continued aggressive extension of equitable fiduciary
obligation is even weaker outside of Delaware. Other states do not retain
separate equity courts as Delaware does294 and do not have Delaware’s
constitutional protection of equitable jurisdiction.295 In the federal context,
the United States Constitution extended the federal judicial power to cover
cases in equity,296 and Congress, rather than establish separate courts of
equity, gave federal courts jurisdiction over cases in law and equity.297
Leading early commentators saw equity playing a gap-filling role in federal
courts as well. Alexander Hamilton wrote in Federalist No. 83 that the equity
courts’ primary role “is to give relief in extraordinary cases, which are
exceptions to general rules.”298 And Justice Joseph Story wrote in 1836 in
his Commentaries on Equity Jurisprudence that there must be cases where
the application of existing rules will either result in injustice or where those
rules “cannot be applied at all.”299 In 1839 the Supreme Court held that
federal courts sitting in equity were bound to follow state laws creating or
eliminating substantive rights, regardless of whether the right existed in
English chancery.300 In 1945 the Supreme Court clarified that, under the Erie
doctrine, federal courts’ equitable powers should not change the outcome of
a suit just because it was litigated in federal rather than state court.301 While
federal courts remain free to apply traditional federal equity rules to rights
arising under federal statutes,302 they remain limited by the general principle

293. Cf. In Re Carlisle, Etcetera LLC, 114 A.3d 592 (Del. Ch. 2015) (“The LLC Act
provides even more means for a creditor to protect itself at law.”) (citations omitted).
294. The only states that still have separate courts for law and equity are Delaware,
Mississippi, and Tennessee.
295. DEL. CONST. art. IV, § 10. See also DuPont v. DuPont, 85 A.2d 724, 729 (Del. 1951)
(“We think the Constitutions of 1792, 1831 and 1897 intended to establish for the benefit of
the people of the state a tribunal to administer the remedies and principles of equity . . . . Its
result is to establish by the Judiciary Article of the Constitution the irreducible minimum of
the judiciary.”).
296. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 1.
297. See Judiciary Act of 1789, §§ 11 (“[T]he circuit courts shall have original
cognizance, concurrent with the courts of the several States, of all suits of a civil nature at
common law or in equity. . . .”), 25 (“[A] final judgment or decree in any suit, in the highest
court of law or equity of a State in which a decision in the suit could be had, . . . may be reexamined and reversed or affirmed in the Supreme Court of the United States. . . .”)
(emphases added).
298. THE FEDERALIST NO. 83 (Alexander Hamilton).
299. Joseph Story, Commentaries on Equity Jurisprudence: as administered in England
and America 9 (W.H. Lyon, Jr. eds., 14th ed. 1918).
300. Clark v. Smith, 38 U.S. 195, 203–04 (1839).
301. Guaranty Trust Co. of N.Y. v. York, 326 U.S. 99, 110–11 (1945).
302. Holmberg v. Ambrecht, 327 U.S. 392, 395 (1946).
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of equity that equitable relief is not available where an adequate remedy at
law is available.
Moreover, the source and authority for the application and enforcement
of modern fiduciary obligations is not rooted in equity or based on the status
or relationship of the parties alone, but flows from the relevant statute,
contract, or both.303 Equity has a long history placing great store in judicial
discretion.304 That same level of discretion is inappropriate in the statutory
and contractual context. With the increasing importance of federal law, the
equitable establishment of fiduciary obligation, as opposed to statutory
obligation, is increasingly being foreclosed.305
A question best left for legislatures. Where courts have found
fiduciary obligations, they have done so in the absence of a statutory
directive by analogizing the relationship in question to a traditional
relationship, typically that of a trustee to a trust.306 But legislatures have now
acted to extend fiduciary obligations by statute to a wide array of
relationships.307 No longer can judges assume that legislatures have left the
establishment of fiduciary obligations to the courts. Legislatures are clearly
aware of fiduciary obligation and provide for fiduciary obligations and
relationships as they deem necessary.
An increased role by legislatures may also help to mitigate hindsight
and other biases that have plagued adjudication of breach of fiduciary duty
cases.308 Of course they are not without biases and flaws of their own. In
fact, legislatures serve as both an outside source of reform to mitigate judicial
bias and as another source of cognitive bias.309 The comparison between
legislatures and judges in this context deserve its own full-length treatment,
but legislatures are at most no worse than judges. More to the point,
legislatures have taken advantage of their prerogative to supplant the courts
as the definers of fiduciary obligation.
303. But see Smith, supra note 93, at 1792–94 (arguing contractually adopted fiduciary
duties should be treated as contractual duties, not fiduciary duties).
304. Bray, supra note 12, at 5 (identifying discretion as one of the hallmarks of equity’s
distinctive mode of reasoning).
305. Cf. Frankel, supra note 4, at 820 n.79 (noting that, because the Supreme Court has
curbed federal common law, federal courts must follow legislation more closely in developing
fiduciary law).
306. See, e.g., Guth v. Loft, Inc., 5 A.2d 503, 510 (Del. 1939) (“While technically not
trustees, [corporate officers and directors] stand in a fiduciary relation to the corporation and
its stockholders.”); Meinhard v. Salmon, 249 N.Y. 458, 464 (1928) (“A trustee is held to
something stricter than the morals of the market place.”).
307. See, e.g., supra Part III (exploring the increasing role of statute and contract in
creating, defining, and limiting fiduciary obligations).
308. See supra Part V (identifying and critiquing the “schema” that judges apply when
analyzing questions of fiduciary obligation and discussing other issues of cognition).
309. Rachlinski, supra note 25, at 101.
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It is also salutary to think of fiduciary law in statutory, rather than
contractual, terms. The contractarians, as befits the name, tend to start at the
contract, casting statutes and organizational documents as providing implied
contractual terms. In this context, at least, it is more useful to think of it in
the other direction. A legislature defines a fiduciary relationship by statute
but may delegate some part of defining that relationship to private parties
through organizational documents or contract.
Business organization context.
Cases involving business
organizations have come to dominate the case law. This has occurred as
business organizations have both vastly increased in overall economic heft
and proliferated in form.310 In particular, the rise of alternative business
entities has made equitable reasoning and analogies to traditional fiduciaries
a poor fit in the business organization context, and nowhere less so than for
LLCs. LLCs are products of statute and creatures of contract.311 Given their
flexibility, they are a poor fit for reasoning by analogy to trusts and for the
top-down application of a schema better suited for such. Additionally,
business organizations do not raise the same concerns as many traditional
fiduciary relationships. Entrustors that can protect themselves from abuses
of power obviate the need for judicial intervention through fiduciary law.312
For publicly traded corporations, shareholders have the ultimate source of
market protection: easy exit. Even for forms used for closely held
businesses, the owners have the opportunity to protect themselves during an
arms-length formation process. Viewed from that perspective, the
traditionalist entrustor-fiduciary paradigm breaks down. Parties enter at
arms-length and frequently risk opportunistic behavior from each other; but
if contractual protections prove insufficient in the aggregate, legislatures can
constrain waivers of fiduciary duties, as they have done with only a very few
exceptions such as the Delaware LLC and LP Acts.313
Wide-ranging fiduciary obligations. Business organizations get more
attention, but legislatures have acted to create or redefine fiduciary
obligations in a wide array of situations.314 Justification for analogy to trust
or other traditional fiduciary relationships breaks down in light of the much
broader range of relationships that now bring fiduciary obligations. Sitkoff
points out that there is “a rich body of interpretative authority on fiduciary
matters,” but much of that case law interprets particular statutory language.

310. See supra Part III (discussing the expanding role of business organizations in
defining fiduciary obligations).
311. Pace, supra note 39, at 1086.
312. Frankel, supra note 4, at 811.
313. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, §§18-1101(c) (LLCs), 17-1101(d) (LPs).
314. See supra Part III (explaining the expansion of fiduciary obligations created and
defined by statute).

PACE_FINAL (DO NOT DELETE)

726

U. OF PENNSYLVANIA JOURNAL OF BUSINESS LAW

10/1/2018 4:12 PM

[Vol. 20.3

315

Fiduciary law has not only spread; it is increasingly customized to fit the
needs of particular categories of relationships.
There are two conclusions to draw from this. One, legislatures are well
aware of fiduciary obligation. Courts should first look to see if there is a
relevant statute. If there is, there is no need for judge-made, equitable rules.
Judges should appreciate that the different needs of diverse, modern
relationships have led to different approaches to and refinements of fiduciary
obligation. Two, only where the legislature has not spoken — including
implicitly — and where no relief is available does a role remain for judgemade, equitable rules. This does not include situations where the legislature
has provided for limited fiduciary duties or for the waiver of duties by the
parties. Accordingly, it is most likely to arise in new types of relationships.
This approach retains flexibility to suit fiduciary law to a modern, changing
economy.
Rational approach to the design problem. The decision by
legislatures to “bolt on” fiduciary obligation to new and diverse types of
relationships has a sound rationale. Legal systems are complex.316 The
modern American legal system has grown into a sprawling, intricate system.
This has come at a price — “the cognitive load of interacting with a system
increases with the number of components.”317 Legislatures have a strong
incentive to mitigate the legal system’s complexity; but they also have an
incentive to expand the system to meet the needs of a growing and changing
economy. These are in tension but are not mutually exclusive.318 One way
to mitigate the costs associated with complexity while expanding the system
is to use a modular design.319 Modular design allows legislatures to bolt on
legal components borrowed from part of the system onto another. In doing
so, they “(1) reduce the cognitive load faced by both designers and users; (2)
make it easier to modify the system by reducing the number of
interdependencies, among its components, and (3) create ‘standardized
modules’ that can be reused when creating new systems with similar
functionality.”320

315. Sitkoff, supra note 171, at 1044.
316. Herbert Simon defined a complex system as “one made up of a large number of parts
that interact in a nonsimple way.” HERBERT SIMON, THE SCIENCES OF THE ARTIFICIAL 86
(M.I.T. Press 1 ed. 1969). One piece of the American legal system, the Code of Federal
Regulations, stood at 175,496 pages at year-end 2013.
317. Manuel A. Utset, Financial System Engineering, 32 REV. BANKING & FIN. L. 371,
410 (2013).
318. Cf. id. at 407 (“One can reduce the overall level of complexity without reducing the
number of rules, or even by adding new ones, by making their interaction more transparent
and easier to understand.”).
319. See generally id. at 411-14 (describing modular design and its use).
320. Id. at 412.
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Legislatures are mostly still part-time at the state level321 and lack the
time, resources, and expertise to design new additions to the legal system
from scratch. They ease their cognitive load by borrowing components from
existing laws in their own state and elsewhere. Fiduciary obligation is one
of those components. We have discussed the cognitive limitations humans
face in processing and responding to information.322 These limitations
manifest as bounded rationality, which leads humans to make sub-optimal
decisions.323 Because those limitations are in part due to “limited
computational skills,”324 reducing the complexity of a system users — here,
fiduciaries and entrustors — are forced to interact with will mitigate the
negative effects of cognitive limitations. Bolting fiduciary obligation onto a
wide variety of types of relationships allows legislatures to meet their goals
of providing a level of protection to entrustors while reducing the cognitive
load on fiduciaries and entrustors. Using a standardized model of fiduciary
obligation has allowed legislatures to bolt existing law onto new areas of the
law from investment advisory services to labor unions to employee benefits
plans.325
Customization to fit the particular needs of those disparate relationships
does add complexity. Legislatures, then, have an incentive to limit the
customization at the statutory level and to delegate defining the full contours
of the fiduciary relationship where significant, individualized customization
is expected to be beneficial. Such customization will frequently be beneficial
because market constraints — including contractual constraints — are often
more effective at a lower cost than regulatory constraints.326 Ease of
modification, both by legislatures and by private parties, is affected by
interdependencies between fiduciary obligations and other components. The
subject has received scant attention, but in at least one context, there is
evidence parties are well aware of those interdependencies. A study of
publicly traded LLCs found that modifications to the duty of loyalty were
often paired with a unanimous consent requirement to amend the operating

321. The National Conference of State Legislatures only classifies legislatures in four
states — California, New York, Michigan, and Pennsylvania — as having full-time, well paid
legislators with large staff. Full- and Part-time Legislatures, NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF
STATE LEGISLATURES (June 14, 2017), http://www.ncsl.org/research/about-state-legis
latures/full-and-part-time-legislatures.aspx [https://perma.cc/MXG8-B5XW].
322. See supra Part V (discussing the development of the law by exploring human
cognition).
323. Christine Jolls, Cass Sunstein, Richard Thaler, A Behavioral Approach to Law and
Economics, 50 STAN. L. REV. 1471, 1477–78 (1998).
324. Id. at 1477.
325. See supra Part III (explaining how the statutes and contracts were used to “bolt-on”
fiduciary obligations in new areas of the law).
326. Utset, supra note 169, at 546.
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agreement in the future.327
The advantages of this design approach, though, are threatened by
judicial intervention. A top-down analysis burdened by an outdated
cognitive schema328 increases costs of customization by increasing
uncertainty for both legislatures and private parties. This may have the effect
of increasing the number of interdependencies among fiduciary obligation
and other areas of the law. That uncertainty adds to the cost of continuing to
bolt fiduciary obligation onto new areas of the law and types of relationships
and of forming a relationship that bring fiduciary obligations with it,
especially if the parties desire to modify those obligations. A bottom-up
approach to analyzing issues of fiduciary obligation would only moderately
add to the cognitive load of judges while allowing legislatures and private
parties to reap the benefit of bolting on fiduciary obligation.329
Fiduciary obligation may crowd out actual morality. That is not to
say that trust and morality do not have an important role to play in fiduciary
relationships of all types. Rational choice theory would suggest that
fiduciaries, especially in the business organization context, have a strong
incentive to shirk and self-deal, because the benefits of doing so would inure
to the fiduciary, the costs would be spread across the owners of the business,
and the likelihood of discovery (and a subsequent judgment of culpability
and liability) are low. This is one reason why traditionalists point to the role
of fiduciary law in enforcing social norms. Contrary to their concerns,
though, the case law reveals less rapacious behavior than we might expect
from viewing actors as entirely self-interested.330 And there is experimental
evidence that cuts against the rational, self-interested presumption. For
example, people are less likely to succumb to the Prisoner’s Dilemma than
game theory predicts.331 People both trust and behave in a trustworthy
manner to a greater extent than market or legal incentives alone would
produce.332 And one study suggests that a more market-based system may

327. Harner and Marincic, supra note 83, at 909, n.122 (finding a unanimity require-ment
in 48.9% of agreements modifying or eliminating the duty of loyalty but in only 29.4% of the
agreements not doing so).
328. See supra Part V (explaining the concept of a schema in psychology and cognitive
science).
329. But of course both legislatures and private parties will make mistakes. See
Rachlinski, supra note 25, at 63 (“Experts who design [complex systems or structures]
commonly fail to foresee ways in which complicated processes can go awry.”).
330. See, e.g., Pace, supra note 39 (exhaustively surveying the applicable case law in 24
states that allow extensive or full waiver in the LLC context).
331. See Richard H. Thaler, MISBEHAVING: THE MAKING OF BEHAVIORAL ECONOMICS
143–46 (1st ed. 2016) (giving real life examples and describing experiments showing more
cooperation than suggested by the Prisoner’s Dilemma).
332. Blair and Stout, supra note 113, at 1738.
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better encourage honesty than a more centrally-planned system.333
That is a very good thing, because business organizations, in particular,
cannot exist without cooperation and trust. Blair and Stout believe that trust
plays a critical role not just in non-profit institutions but also in the business
corporation.334 Trust is even more important for privately held alternative
business entities. Where market constraints post-formation are weaker,
participants must deal with each other more frequently, and the availability
of opportunism may be greater. But even in large, publicly held
corporations, parties cooperate because of both internal and external
constraints.335
In light of this, designing an optimal approach to the problems fiduciary
law seeks to address is no easy task. The promise of reward and threat of
punishment is not always the best way to promote cooperation.336 In fact, a
system of external threats and rewards can actually lead to decreased
cooperation. Such attempts may “reduce levels of trust and trustworthiness
within the firm by eroding corporate participants’ internal motivations.”337
And external incentives may even lead to worse outcomes than if there were
no external incentives.338 Even a contractual penalty such as a liquidated
damages provision may increase the likelihood of efficient breach.339
Certainly in the business organization context, where fiduciary duties look
and act much like contractual provisions, the possibility that fiduciary duties
will increase the likelihood of a breach of those duties must be taken into
account. It also suggests that the intuitive evaluation of the effect of waiver
of fiduciary duties may be off-base.340 All of this suggests that morality and
social norms have a role to play in fiduciary law, but that the contours of that
role are not as easily discerned as we may suspect. This counsels both in

333. See Dan Ariely et al., The (True) Legacy of Two Really Existing Economic Systems,
Munich Discussion Paper No. 2014-26, at 9 (March 19, 2015), available at http://epub.ub.unimuenchen.de/20974 [https://perma.cc/3CMQ-GHEF] (reporting a study finding that subjects
with an East German background cheated twice as much in an experiment as subjects with a
West German background).
334. Blair and Stout, supra note 113, at 1739.
335. Id. at 1737–38.
336. Id. at 1739.
337. Id.
338. See generally, SAMUEL BOWLES, THE MORAL ECONOMY: WHY GOOD INCENTIVES
ARE NO SUBSTITUTE FOR GOOD CITIZENS 39–77 (Yale Univ. Press 2016) (reporting
experiments where external incentives led to less optimal results than no external incentives).
339. See generally Tess Wilkinson-Ryan, Do Liquidated Damages Encourage Breach? A
Psychology Experiment, 108 MICH. L. REV. 633 (2010) (reporting experimental findings that
liquidated damages provisions make breach of contract more likely).
340. What is even less clear is what the effect of just modifying, not waiving, fiduciary
duties would be. It may be that it makes breach more likely, but it also may be that it makes
breach less likely.
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favor of caution and in favor of allowing legislatures to experiment with
different approaches to fiduciary obligation.
CONCLUSION
To divide fiduciary obligation into two bodies of law instead of one is
a simplification, but it is a necessary simplification.341 Nor is it the only way
to describe fiduciary law, but it is rooted in the historical development of
fiduciary obligation and it bridges the divide between the traditionalist and
contractarian camps in the literature. More importantly, it identifies the
primary problem with the current approach — that judges too often apply a
schema better suited for traditional, equitable fiduciary obligations top-down
instead of engaging in a bottom-up analysis — and establishes that the
modern, statutory and contractual approach is sensible in light of changes in
the law and the economy and is advantageous from a design standpoint.
Fiduciary obligation has grown into two distinct bodies of law. But the
language used over and over again by courts, reflecting the schema
frequently applied by courts, remains rooted in only one of those two bodies
of law. Reducing the rate of judicial error in breach of fiduciary duty cases
requires a recognition that those two distinct bodies of law exist and the
abandonment of schema-driven thinking in favor of bottom-up analysis.
That will, in part, require a recognition that the definition and modification
of fiduciary obligations by statute and contract is equally valid to equitable,
relationship-based fiduciary obligation. Both Congress and state legislature
can be expected to continue to expand fiduciary obligation to new
relationships, define its contours, and delegate further definition of its
contours to private parties. They should be encouraged to do so, in large part
because borrowing traditional, equitable fiduciary obligation and bolting it
onto new areas of the law is lower cost than creating a substitute from
scratch. That cost will be further reduced by judges moving to a bottom-up
analysis that will better account for value-added statutory and contractual
modification.

341. Cf. Anne Tucker, Jeffrey Lipshaw: Regarding Uncorporations, Is Contract a King
or Mere Pretender to the Throne? (Micro-symposium), Bus. L. Prof Blog (Nov. 16, 2015),
http://lawprofessors.typepad.com/business_law/2015/11/jeff-lipshaw-regardinguncorporations-is-contract-a-king-or-mere-pretender-to-the-throne-micro-sympo.html
[https://perma.cc/7M2Z-NU5X]. (“The contractual, corporate, and uncorporate models are
always reductions in the bits and bytes of information from the complex reality, and that’s
what makes them useful, just as a map of Cambridge, Massachusetts that was as complex as
the real Cambridge would be useless.”).

